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Abstract
Th e original CAST cip her is an efficient and secure private-key block cipher des igned
to be an al temanve to th e Da ta Encryption Standard (DES ). In t his thesis, we present
a new class of unbalan ced CAST ciphers which employs the same st ruc tu re of S-box
and rou nd functi on of the origin al CAST cipher but has a lower mem ory requirement .
enbalanced CAST ciphers with one or two 8 x 32 S-boxes in the round fun ct ion require
only l /-t or 1/ 2 the memory of the original CAS T cipher. respec t ively.
This thes is examin es the ap plication of differential and linear cryptanalysis, two
of the most powerful methodologies for attacking private-key block ciphers, to the
unbalanced. CAST ciphers. The results of an alysis show t hat a 48- round unbalanced
CAS T ciphe r with one 8 x 32 S-box and a 24- round un balanced CAST cipher with
two 8 x 32 S-b oxes. bo th of which are equivalent to a 12-round ori ginal C AST cipher
in efficiency, are resistan t to both different ial and linear cryptan alysis .
We also invest igate the unbalanced CAST ciphers from the perspective of informa-
tio n theo ry. Th e resul ts sugges t that the maxi mu m static and dyn am ic input-out put
bit inform ation leakages for the unbalanced CAST ciphers cons t ructed by 8 x 32
Scboxes are much smal ler than for DES.
The conclusion reached by th e thesis is that unbalanced CAST ciphers can be
considered to be efficient , secure cip hers which require less memory tha n the original
CAS T cipher.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years , with the rapid growth of computer networks, tbe threa t of intercept-
ing and /o r modifying information during its transfer across a public communication
cha nne l has increased . Cryptogmphy, the science of making information unintelligible
and unm odifiab le by an unauthorized intercepto r and still accessible or verifiable by
a legit imate receiver. is becom ing more and more impo rtan t in tbe field of communi-
ca tions. Figu re 1.1 illus t rat es a genera l cryp togra phic system.
Plaintext
Encryption ---J En,l, ;on I
Key
Ciphertext
Plaintext
IDee)",n '-- cecrvcncn
Key
Figure 1.1: A Ge neral Cryptographic System
Encryption, performed by a transmitte r, is a. t ransforming process th rough which
the original information is rep laced by the secret informat ion, while decryption is a
reverse process performed by a receiver . The message to be encrypted is referred to
as the plaintext and t he encrypted message is referred to as the ciphertext. A set
of rules by which a transmitter encrypts t he plai ntext and a receive r decry pts the
ciphe rtext is called a cipher. Norm ally t he operat ion of the cipher de pends on a key.
Cryp tography is the science of designing a cipher , while cryptanalysis is the art of
breaking the cip her , that is. essentially de termining the key. Cryptology includes bot h
cryptogra phy and cyp tan alysis.
Cryptography may general ly be divided into two categories: pu blic-key ciphers and
private-key ciphers. In a public-key cip her, the encryption key and the decry ption
key are d ifferent . Since it is computa t ionally infeasible to determine a decryption
key given an encryption key, the encrypt ion key can be made pu blic. Therefore , any
t ransmit ter can send an encryp ted message wit h a pub lic encryption key, while only
the receiver with a secret decryp t ion key ca n decrypt the ciphertext correct ly. ln
a private- key ciphe r. t he encryption key and the decryption key ar e the sam e and
kept secret . Th e key must be distributed by a secure chan nel before any ciphe rtext
is transmit ted . In some cases . this may be d ifficult to achieve . However. generally
private-k ey ciphers have a much higher encryption/ decrypt ion rate than public -key
ciphers. In t his thes is, we focus our attention on private-key cip hers which encrypt
and decrypt data in blocks of bits .
1.1 Motivation for the Research
T he most wide ly used priva te- key block encrypt ion algorithm, t he Data Encryption
Standard (DES) (241 was first approved by the National Bureau of Sta ndards (NBS )
in 1977 and was most recently reaffirmed in 1993, unt il December L998. DES has been
involved in controversy since its release . Its 56-bit key size has received wide cri ticis m
and its design princip les are still unknow n. Afte r twenty years , DES is nearing the end
of its useful life and is theo retically breakab le by two powerful cryptan alyt ic attacks,
differential and linear cryptanalysis [3, 19J. In addi tion, DES was exp licitly designed
for fast hardware imp lementation and has a slow software performance {21j.
The National Inst it ute of Standards and Technology (~IST) is initiating a process
to develop a Federal Informa tion Processing Sta ndard (FI PS ) for an Advanced En-
crypt ion Standard (AES) incorporating an Advanced Encryp tion Algorithm (AEA) as
a replacement standard of DES at the 1998 review. As the first step in this process ,
draft minim um acceptabili ty requirements and draft criteria to evaluate candidate
algorit hms have been issued :
- AES sha ll be pu blicly defined.
- AES sha ll be a symmetric private-key block cipher.
- AES shall be designed so that the key lengt h may be increased as needed .
- AES shal l be imple menta ble in both hardware and software.
- AES shall be eit her freely availab le or available under terms consistent wit h the
American Nat ional Standards Institute (ANSI) pa tent po licy.
- Algorithms which meet the above requirements will be judged based on the
following factors:
• security,
• com putational efficiency,
• memory requirements.
... ha rdware and software suitability.
• simplicity,
• flexibi lity, and
... licensing requirements.
The orig inal CAST cipher (2) is a symme tric block cipher and appears to be re-
sistant to differential and linear cryptanalysis [18, 14J. It is easily implemented by
software and has a good encryption/decryption perfo rmance on 32-bit microproces-
sors because of using four large 8 x 32 substitutions (S-boxes) and elimina ting the
need of per mutations (P cboxes) which are awkward to implement in software . How-
ever, large S-boxes require more memory to store their lookup tables. This might be
unacceptable in some implementations where the memory is ext remely restricted .
We present a family of ciphers referred to as un balanced CAST ciphers , which
employ the same type of S-box and round function as the original CAST cipher and
require a variable amount of memory depending on the chosen pa rameters.
1.2 Contributions of this Research
In this t hesis, we present a new class of private-key block cip hers known as unbalanced
CAST ciphers, incorpo rating the same structure of the S-box and round function
of the original CAST cipher. The cip hers in this new class are simp le, fast , and
suitable for software and hardware implementa t ions. They have a variable memory
requirement and a v'ariable num ber of rounds . We analyze the security of this new
class of ciphers with respect to differential and linear cryptanalysis and its information
theoretic properties so that t he user can explicitly manipu late the trade-off between
higher speed and higber security. The results of the analysis show that tbe unbalanced
CAST ciphers with prop er parameters and an appropriate number of round s are
secure and promising ciphers.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
The organization of the remainder of t his t hesis is as following: Chap ter 2 gives an
overview of p revious research t hat is directly relevant to our work. Chapter 3 present s
a detai led discussion of differential and linear cryptanalysis techniques. Chapter 4
describes a new gener al class of unbalanced CAST ciphers and its design decisions .
Chapter 5 examines the resistance of t he unbalanced CAST ciphers wit h a set of
typical parameters to differential cryptanalysis . Chapter 6 examines the resistance of
the unbalanced CAST ciphers to linear cry ptan alys is. Chapter 7 views the unbalanced
CAST ciphers from the perspective of information theory. Finally, Chapter 8 provides
a summary of the results of the thesis and some suggestions for further research .
Chapter 2
Review of Previous Research
In this chap te r we present a review of previous research on priva te-key blo ck ciphers
which is directl y rela ted to our work.
2. 1 A rchitectures
In this sect ion , we introduce two main ar chitectures which are widely quoted in de-
signing private-key block ciphers. Other archit ectures are also detailed in the next
section.
2.1 .1 Subst itution P ermutation Networks
In 1949. Shan no n [311 proposed two differe nt conce pts of confusion and d iffusion in
cryp tography, Such concepts are embodied in a Substitution-Permutation Network
(SPN), pro posed by Feistel [111 and Feiste l, et a1 (12).
The SP:'J consists of a number of substitution-permut at ion layers (SP layers),
each of which is composed of several sm all sub-block subs t itutions (S-boxes) and a
large bit permutation (P-box). The S-box which provides nonlinear input-output bit
trans formations fulfills Shannon's concept of confusion. The P-box which o ffers linear
Figure 2.1; An Example of Subst itution-Permutation Networks
bit spreading operations among S-boxes achieves Shan non 's concept of diffusion. A
primary key is used to generate all subkeys implemented in each SP layer according
to an algori thm referred to as a key schedule. Key schedules will not be discussed in
this thesis . In each SP layer. a subkey is either XQRed with the input bits of that
layer, then fed into the Scboxes , or used to select different mapp ings for the S-boxes
in that layer. Two layers of an SP~ based on -t-btt S-boxes are shown in F igure 2.1.
2.1.2 DES-like Block Ciphers
Feistel, et at [12J proposed another cipher structure which was adopted by the Natio nal
Bureau of Standards (NBS) as th e network architect ure of DES [24J. Such a structure,
illust rated in Figure 2.2, is known as the DES-like cipher architecture.
Unlike SPNs , a DES-like cip her divides an N-bit plaint ext into two N/2 -bit ha lves
referred to as the left and right halves. For each round , the right half is input into
a round function F whose outp ut is bit- wise XORed with the left half, then the two
';,
.1. .. t ,
~~ . :... . - • • - -----~ F :-.- ••••••• • - . ~
~ .. ' ". - - :
Figure 2.2: The Structure of DES-like Ciphers
halves are swapped . After R rounds . the two halves are concatenated to form th e
N-bit ciphe rt ext. The cipher can be viewed as the following iterated operation :
L; H.-I
for 1 $. i :$ R - I , and
(2.1)
(2.2)
where e represents bit-wise XOR.
Encryption and dec rypt ion are achieved by the same algorithm. However. for
decrypt ion the su bkeys are used in reverse order. A key schedule is designed to
generate subkey K, for every round from a cipher key.
The plain text randomization is performed by the round function , which is the
crucial part in DES- like ciphers. The main difference among many DES-like ciphers
is tbe struc ture of the round functio n.
DES is a 64-bit block cipher which has L6 rounds and a 56-hit key size. The
round function first expands its 32-bit inpu t to a 48-bit block using a bit-select ion
tab le. The expanded block is t hen XORed with a 48-hit subkey generated by the key
schedule algorithm. The XORed -18-bit block is finally fed into eight 6 x 4 S-boxes
whose output passes through a 32-b it permuta tion to be the 32-bit output of the
rou nd functio n.
2.2 Proposed Private-key Block Ciphers
Man y private-key block ciphers have been proposed as potential rep lacements for
DES. These ciphers may be DES-like or not . In this sect ion we int roduce severa l
algori thms.
FEAL [32, 23J is exactly a DES-like encryption algorithm. It is a 54-bit block
cipher with a 54-bi t key which can be easil y and efficiently implemented in the 8-bit
microprocessor enviro nmen t. The 8 x 8 S-boxes in the roun d funct ion perform byte
rota tio ns and XOR add itions . Ln fcrtunar eiy, FEAL wit h less than 8 roun ds was
easily broken by differenti al cryp tanalysis [41. and requi res at least 32 rounds to be
resistant to different ial cryptan alysis [261.
LOKI [.Jis also a 6-&-bit block cipher with a 64-bi t key simil ar to DES. The round
funct ion employs 12 x 8 Scboxes based on irred ucib le polynomials. and re-arran ges
the expansion and permutation tables. The initi al versio n of LOKI was found to be
susce pti ble to differential cry ptanalysis [5J, and has since been strengthened (6).
IDEA (1. ] is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit key. It is not exactl y a DES-
like cipher in nature. The concepts of confusion an d diffus ion are achieved by mixing
th ree differe nt groups of ope rations - bit by bit exclusive-OR, addi tion of integers , and
mu ltip lication of integers. It is claim ed that th e im pro ved versio n of the ciph er is eas ily
imp lemented in software and hardware, and resistan t to differential cryp tanalysis.
Khafre (211 is a software-oriented encryption algorithm with 64-b it blocks whose
number of rounds is not specified , but should be a mu ltip le of eight . T he round
funct ion employs an 8 x 32 S-box to perform the plaintext rand omization , and a
rotation schedu le brings every byte of the plaintext to th e input of the S-box once
every eigh t rounds . Bibam successfully a pplied differential cryptanal ysis to break
16-round Khaf re with 1536 encryptio ns (5].
RCS [28] is a fast word-oriented. symm etric block cipher suitable for software
imp lemen tations. It is a parameterized fami ly of encry pti on algorithms, which has
a vari able word size , a vari able number of rounds, and a variable-length sec re t key.
Differen t from the concept of SPNs , th e novel featu re of RC5 is the heavy use of
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da ta -dependent rotations in which one word of inte rmediate data is cyclically rotated
by an amount determined by th e low-order bits of another word of intermedia te da ta .
It appears to frus tr ate differential cryptanalysis and linear cry pt analysis [15].
2 .3 Cryptographic Properties
In th is section, we present several cry p tographic properties which are importan t to
design and analyze the S-box and the whole cipher st ruct ure .
2.3 .1 Nonlinearity
If some of the plai ntex t bits , ciphertext bits, and key bit s have linear relat ions , the
cipher could be eas ily broken by solving a set of linear equations wit h a smal l amount
of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs . Since Scboxes are the only nonlinear components
in SP Ns and DES-like ciphers, the design of highly nonlinear S-boxes becomes crucial
to the development of highly secu re ciphers.
An m-bit affine boolean function is defined to be a funct ion of the form
(2.3)
where X =[Xt , . . , Xm } represent s the rn-bit binary inpu t and a. E {O,l}, 0 :$ i :5m.
The Ham ming distan ce between two m-bit boolean functions, f(X) and y(X ) , can
be defined to be
dU,g) =#{X E (a, q mlf (X ) Ellg(X) = i} .
Then t he nonlinearity of an m-bit boo lean function / is defined as
NU ) = ~ij dU,y}
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(2.4)
(2.5)
where A is the set of all m-bit affine boolean functions. Since an m x n S-box has
n output bits. each of which is an m-bi t boolean function. t he nonlinearity of the
S-box S is defined as t he minimum nonlinearity over all non-zero linear combinat ions
of output bit boolean function s:
.V{S) ~ min N{ EBc, f, )
c,E{O.t} . ....,All c. =O ' = 1
where f , is the m-bit bo olean function of tbe i-th output bit of the Scbox.
(2.6)
The maximum nonlineari ty of an m-bit boo lean function for even values of m is
given by (20J
(2.7 )
Onl y a special class of fun ctio ns referred to as bent functions [291can achieve maxi-
mum nonlineari ty. Nyber g [25}proves that an m x n S-box can be perfectly nonlinear
[i.e. N(S) =Nma.o: ) if and only if m ?: 2n.
2.3 .2 In for m a t io n Theory
Th e basic concepts of information t heory, such as entropy, mutual information. equiv-
ocarlon. and redu ndancy were first int roduced by Shannon [311 to analyze the security
of cryptosystems. Let P be the pla intext and C be the ciphertext. If the conditional
ent ropy H (P [C ) is equal to the ent ropy H (P). tben tbe ciphe r has perfect secrecy.
Unfortunately, perfect secrecy is general ly im prac t ical to achieve .
Ferre (I3j first presented a set of cry ptogra phic properties of S-boxes based on
information tbeory. Dawson and Tavares [101 extended Ferre's ideas to define an
expanded set of des ign criteria for cryptographical ly st rong Scboxes . Sivabalan . et al
12
{33J developed Dawson and Tavares 's infonnation leakage from a single bit level to a
mult iple bit level.
Let two random variables X and }" have possible values X E { I t , . . , I m } and
y' E {Yt . . . .Yn} sepa rately. T he uncertainty or entropy of Y is defined as
H (Y) ~ - ;P(y, )IOgp(y,) (2.8)
where p(y, ) is the probability of Y = Yi' The condit ional ent ropy of Y given X is
define d as
H(YIX) ~ - f: f :.(x" y, ) logp(.,lx,)
;=l j=1
(2.9)
where p(I; 'YJ) is the joint probability of X = I . and Y = YJ' and P(Yj !Xi) is the
conditional probability of}' =Yj given X =Xi ' T he base of tbe logarithm is ar bit rary
and amounts to a constan t multipli ca ti ve factor .
The stat ic input-ou tpu t informa tion leakage of an S-box is tbe mutual information .
l (}-', X ). and is defined as
f (Y. X ) = H (Y ) - H (Y"IX ) (2 .10)
where X is any subset of the inpu t bits , and Y is any subset of out put bits of an
S-box . The dynamic inpu t-o ut put informa tion leakage is the mu tual information,
[ (.;lY.~X) , and is define d as
(2.11)
where .;lX is XOR changes in a subset of inp ut bits , and ~y is XOR changes in a
subset of output bits of an S-box .
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An ideal S-box shou ld have both static and dynamic input-output information
leakage equal to zero. However. due to the determini st ic nature of an S-box whose
inp ut-output mappings are known. an ideal S-box can not be obtained. T he crypto-
graphically stro ng S-box must have as small an informa tion leakage as possi ble. Th is
is often an objective of designi ng a private-key block cipher.
The stat ic and dynamic information leakage reflect the vulner ability of an Scbox
to correlation attacks. differential crypt analysis and linear cryp tana lysis. In [37J,
Zhang , Tavares and Campbell suggested that the informa tion leakage can be used
as a fundamental measure of the strength of an S-box and an encryp tion algorithm
comp rehensively, instead of all oth er cryptographic criteria which general ly only re-
flect one aspect of vulnerability separately, such as nonlinearity, higher order St rict
Avalanche Criteri on (SAC) , and correlation immunity.
2. 3 .3 Other C ry p t ographic Properties
Other cryptographic properties are avalanche Ill, 12), completeness (16] and the SAC
[34]. For a cipher. the avalanche criterion is st rictly satisfied if. on average , half of the
cip hertext bits will change when one plaintext bit changes . and the comp leteness cri-
te rion is sat isfied if all outp ut bits depend on all inpu t bits. In 18], Brown and Seberry
have found that DES is complete after four to five rounds with a high probability.
webster and Tavares combi ned the avalanche and completeness criteria into the
SAC. A cipher satisfies SAC if a one bit plaintext change causes each ciphertext bit
to change with a probability of 1/2 . DES has been found to sa tisfy SAC afte r five or
six rounds.
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2.4 Cryptanalysis
T he objective of cry ptan alys is is to d etermine a secret master key used in a cip her.
The general classes of cry p ta na lysis are ciphertext only. known plaintext . and chosen
plai ntext . A ciphertext only at tack bas the knowledge of ciph ert exts only. A known
plain text attack uses the knowledge of both plaintexts and cor respo nding ctphe rte xrs.
A chosen plaintext att ack assumes tha t a cryptan alyst can choose specific sets of
plaintexta, and obtain tbe correspondi ng sets of cipherte xts .
In this sect ion, we briefly intr oduce the three most powerful and widely used cryp t-
an alys is techniques of pri vate-key block ciphers. Different ial and linear cryp tanalysis
will be described in more de tai l in the next cha pte r.
2.4 .1 Exhaustive Key Search
Th e met hod of exh austive key search is a known plaintext at tack . Th e cryptanalyst
first acquires a known plai ntext-cipher text pair encrypted with an unkn own mas ter
key and encrypt s the known plaintex t with all possi ble keys. When a key generates
the correct ciphertex t , with high pro bability, it is the correct key. If necessary, several
known plaintext-ciphertext pai rs can be used to verify its cor rectn ess.
Usually ciphers are designed to have a large enough key size to mak e exhaustive
searc h infeasible. Unfort unately, the 56-bit key size of DES is so small that it has re-
ceived ext ensive criticis m. In general . if the work load of a cryptanalyt ic at tac k is less
than the work load for exh austiv e sear ch of the key space, t he cipher is theoretic ally
broken.
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2.4.2 D ifferent ial Cryptanalysis
In [31. Biham and Sharnir developed differenti al cry ptanalysis, one of the mos t pow.
erful cryp tanaly t ic method s on ite rate d produ ct ciphers. such as SP :'-J's and DE S-like
ciphers. T hey have published a series of papers attacking DES, FEAL, LOKI, and
ot her proposed ciphers by differential cryp tan alysis [3, 4. 5), which have forced the
re-design of several proposed ciphers . Most imp ressively, they have demo nstrated a
successfu l cryp tanalysis of 16-round DES with 241 chosen plain texts [3J.
Differential cry ptanalysis is a chosen plainte xt attack which compares the bit-wise
XOR value of two pla intext s to th e XOR value of the correspondi ng two ciphert exts.
In an S-bo x. the knowledge of the in put XOR of a pai r cannot guarantee the knowledge
of its ou tput XOR. However, every in put XOR of an S-box suggests a probabilistic
dis tribution of the possible output XORs . Given a particula r input XOR , it is pos-
sible for some output XORs to have a relat ively high probability. It is such high
prob abilities th at can be utili zed to exploit multipl e round XOR struct ures ca lled
different ial char acte rist ics with a high probabili ty and derive a portion of th e subkey
bits applied in an R-round cip her.
In order to make the round funct ion immune to differential cryp tan alysis, several
me thods have bee n proposed . One is to reduce high probabilities in XOR distribu tions
of S-boxes, which can be achie ved by extendin g th e number of output bits of the S-
boxes t o a reasonable value [21. Another approach is to replace the XOR ope ration
in the round function which involves the subk ey by a modular multiplication to bide
the input of the S-boxes [11.
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2.4 .3 Linear Cry ptanal ys is
In f191, Mats ui introduced a known plaintext attack agai ns t DES: linear cry ptanal-
ysis. It studies statist ical linear relat ions between bits of plaintexts, ciphertexrs and
subkeys. By th is met hod. the full 16-rouod DES cipher is broken with 241 known
plaintext-ciphertex t pairs .
Truly , there are man y st at ist ical linear relati ons referred to as linear approxima-
tions between input and outp ut bits or an S-box. Since all operations in DES , except
the Scboxes. are linea r, these linear relations can be utilized to const ruc t a linear ap-
proximation or th e ent ire algorithm. Mats ui presented two algorithms to derive the
subkey bits from a linear approximation, based on hypothesis test ing. Algorit hm 1
can retrieve an equi valent subkey bit expressed as the XOR sum or the subkey bits .
Algorithm 2 ca n more efficiently find a number of the subkey bits at one t ime.
It is obvious that choosing S-boxes with high nonlinearity is an effective way to
make SP Ns resistant to linear cry ptanalysis. Int roducing nonli near operations in
round functions is another way to make ciphers imm une to linear cryptanalysis. such
as key-dependent rotations (28) and modu lar add it ions and subtract ions [301.
2.5 Design of CAST components
Adams and Tavares [2] proposed a new DES-like cry p tosystem called the CAST
encrypt ion algorithm, which seems promising in resistance to different ial and linear
cryptan alysis, and has high encryption/dec ryption perfo rmance.
In t his sect ion , we int rod uce the CAST design procedure , focussing main ly on t he
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structure of the S-box and the round funct ion. which are significantly different from
DES.
2.5 .1 Subs titut ion Box
As wementioned . the S-box in an SP>i or DES-like cipher is very impo rtant to securit y
since it is the only source of nonlinearity. The CAST design procedure makes use of
S-boxes which have fewer input bits than output bits , such as 8 x 32 Scboxes. Some
research has indicated t hat this class of S-boxes exhibits good confusion , complete
diffusion. good avalanche, highest-order SAC, a fiat distribution of outp ut XORs, and
high nonlinearity [221. These important cryptographic properties directl y influence
the security and efficiency of the enti re algorithm. Altbough confusion, diffusion, and
avalanche are somewhat abstract concepts and cannot be proven formal ly. the CAST
cipher constructed by such S-boxes shows good sta tistical properties afte r 2-3 rounds
while DES needs 5-6 rounds to exhib it similar proper ties .
2.5 .2 Round Fun ction
Round functions of DES and CAST with a 64-bit blocksize are shown in Figure 2.3,
where E and P are the expansion and permutation functions of DES. In the round
funct ion of CAST . 32-bit data R..- l is input to t he round function and XORed with a
subkey K i • The 32-bit result is split into four 8-bit pieces each of which is input to a
different 8 x 32 S-box and the four 32-hit Scbox outputs are XORed togethe r to form
the 32-bit modified dat a, F(~_l , K i ) . Altho ugh each S-box causes dat a expansion,
the structure of the round function guarantees that there is no data expansion by the
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Figure 2.3: The Round Funct ions or DES and CAST
round funct ion operation.
We have not iced tha t CAST eliminates th e permuta tion layer in its round func-
t ion beca use of usin g four large 8 x 32 S-boxes . In the round funct ion of DES. the
permuta t ion serves to sp read output bit chang es from a single small S-bo x ever t he
block half so that these changes are input to several smal l S-boxes in the next round .
In CAST . each S-box d irect ly affects t he enti re block half so tha t any out put bit
change is guara nteed to affect all Scboxes in the next round without a permuta t ion
layer. This modificati on grea tly benefits the softwar e im plementa t ion and imp roves
t he encryption/d ecryption perform ance beca use t he permu tation is inefficiently im-
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plemented in software. CAST has been shown to be two to three t imes faster than a
ty pical imp lementation of DES [11.
2 .6 C ryp t analysis of CAST
In this sect ion. we describe three different at tacks which have been applied to the
CAST encryption algorithm. di fferent ial and linear cryptana lysis. and the attack
based on non-surjective round funct ions.
2.6 .1 D iffer ential C ryp t analys is of CAS T
Lee, et al [181 showed that CAST , using randomly genera ted Scboxes. is resistant
to differential cryptan alysis. In the ir paper , they deve loped a met hod to predict
the entry distribution of the XOR table of the round func tion of CAST. Although
each S-box has a highest differe ntial proba bility of 2- 7 • a simple screening process
can be applied to prevent the occurrence of a 2-round it erat ive char acteris tic with a
probab ility of 2- 7• They claimed that the best 2-round iterat ive characteristic has a
probability of 2- 104 for CAST, while the corresponding probability in DES is 1/234.
In general, a (R - 2)-round characterist ic can be used to at tack an R~round cipher.
Using a concatenation of the four best z-rc und iterat ive charac teristics. a 10-round
CAST has a characteristic with a probabili ty of 2- 56 , which is better than one for
16-round DES .
2.6.2 Linear Cryptanalysis of C A ST
Heys and Tavares [14] invest igated the securit y of CAST with respect to linea r crypt-
analysis. Assuming that all four 8 x 32 S-boxes have nonlinearities greater than or
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equal to 64. the analysis shows that at least z50 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs are
required for lineae cryptanalysis to de te rmine only one equiva lent key bit of a 12-rou nd
CAST . compared to z47 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs required to determ ine all
key bits of 16-round DES. Furt hermore, it is a very difficult tas k for a cryptanalyst
to find a lineae approximation close to the [ower bo und .
The result also suggests th at at leas t 99.95% of all rand omly gene rated 8 x 32 S-
boxes have non linearities of at least 64. In recent experiments, aUrandomly genera ted
8 x 32 S-boxes have been found to have nonlineari t .iesgreater than 72 [361.
2.6.3 Attack Based on Non-surjective Round Functions
Hijmen and Preneel [271suggested a statistical attack on DES-like ciphers wit h non-
surjective or non-unifo rm round functions . For a DES-like ciphe r with R rounds . the
following equa tion holds:
By rearranging the terms in Equation 2.12. then
1l12-1
.3R_2 ( L o, fl<J , K) = ~ F2.(K2i ED R2i- tl = il<J EB LR ED FR(KR EB RR)' (2.13)
If the number of rounds R is small, non-surjective round functions F2i .....ill result
in a non-sur jecti ve fJR-2 . A basic at tac k can be carried on by calculat ing the right
hand side of Equat ion 2.13 using the known plai ntext il<J and ciphertext L R for all
values K R ' Wrong key cand idates will eventua lly produce a value .....hich is outs ide
th e range of .BR _2• Even if the number of round R becomes lar ger and {JR - 2 becomes
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surjective. 3R _ 2 will not be uniformly distributed. A statistical a ttack ca n still be
applied to derive the most pro ba ble keys.
T he round function of CAS T is constructed by four 8 x 32 Scboxes . T he output is
obtained by XORing the outputs of four S-boxes each of which on ly has 256 out puts
ou t of 232 all possible values . If t he four S-boxes are selected randomly. the expected
numb er of possible outputs are ( l -e- I ) x 232 , where e deno tes the na tur al logarit hm
base , about 63% of all poss ible va lues .
The basic attack can be applied to 6-roun d CAST , requiring a work facto r of
1.5 x 24t1 operations and 82 known plaintext- ciphertext pairs. However , this attack is
not applicable to CAST with mo re than six rounds since the XOR sum of two CAS T
round functions is surjective. The statistical a ttack has not been implemented d ue
to the requirement of a table of size 232 •
2.7 Conclusion
We have int rod uced two main st ructures of encryption algorithms used in private-key
block ciphers, and seve ral pro posed block ciphers. In addition, we have presen ted
several cryptogr aphic properties that are crucial to design and analyze Scboxes and
ciphers. Furthermore, we have brie fly int roduced the two most powerfu l cryp tan alys is
methods of private-key block ciphers . F inally, we have out lined th e C AST enc ryption
algorithm des ign proce du re and discussed the security of the CAST with respect to
three proposed a ttacks.
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Chapter 3
Differential and Linear
Cryptanalysis
[0 t his chapte r, we desc ribe different ial and linear cryptanalysis in more det ai l. Both
attacks have successfully been applied to a variety of SPNs or DES· like ciphers and
have forced those ciphers to be redesigned to enhance their security . Differenti al and
linear cry ptanalysis a ppear to be fairly general-pu rpose at tacks and help to qualify
the des ign parame ters of privat e key block ciphers.
3 .1 D ifferential C ryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis [3}is a chosen plaintext attack which ut ilizes highly probab le
occurrences of outp ut XOR differences of each round function, given part icular input
XOR differences. In t his section we first int roduce definitions of XOR tabl es and
characteris tics, and then describ e the genera l attack.
3.1.1 XOR Table
A ta ble which shows the distrib ution of the input XORs and outp ut XORs of all
the possible pairs of an S-box is called the XOR table. In the XOR tab le, each
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row corresponds to a particular input XOR value, each column correspo nds to a
partic ular output XOR value. For a given m x n S-bo x const ruc ted from a mapping
5: {O.l }'" -+ {O, l ]" , let ting .;lX E {a, t t ' and..lY E {a, l ]" , the XOR table ent ry
of the S-box corresponding to (.!lX . ~Y) is defined as
XOR(t.X. ,,"y' ) =# {X E (O.l}mIS(X) EllS(X Ell""XI ~ ,,", '} (3.1)
where # denotes the cardinality of the set and e represents bit-wise XOR. The XOR
tab le has the following features:
- A zero input XOR always generates a zero output XOR, since the same input
value will map to the same output value.
- Entries in an XOR table are always multip les of 2, because two inp ut pairs
(X. X e ~X) and (X Efl.!lX , Xl will yield the same out put difference .:11" .
- ~ot all entri es are poss ible. For example . about 20% of all entr ies are impossible
in a 6 x 4 S-box of DES.
Consider Figu re 3.1. Let X and X · be two input data blocks , Y and Y · be two
corresponding output data blocks. and K be a subkey . Then we have I = X e K and
I" = X · EEl K . It is obvio us that
(3.2)
where ~X = X e X · , t11 = I e t -, Equation 3.2 means that the act ual input
XOR to the S-box • .6.1,does not depend on t he subkey. However, tbe out put XOR
~r' = Ye Y · does depen d on the subkey because bot h Y and Y · are related to the
subkey in a non linear fash ion.
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Figu re 3.1: Input and Outp ut of an Scbox
If a tri ple (X, X ', ~Y) is known. th e XOR ta ble will suggest that there are
XOR(~X. ,;lY) possible inpu t values to th e Scbox. which can derive a set of possible
subke ys by K =X ED I. Given many such triples, tbe co rrect subke y is suggest ed by
al l t riples.
3 .1 .2 C haracteristic
Let tbe input and out p ut XOR differences of the i-th round fun ction be ,;lX . and
.:11';, resp ect ively. T hen tbe proba bility with which ,;lX. ma y cause .:lY; is d eno ted.
by Pi- An r-round charac teristic. Or. is defined as a sequence of XOR difference
pairs Or = {( .:lX\ , .:lYt ) • . . , (.:lXT, j,Yr ) } . From Figure 3.2, all XOR pairs of the
charact erist ic sa t isfy the following requirements:
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Figu re 3.2; r -Ro und Characterist ic nO'
(3.3 )
where th e input and outp ut XORs of th e characteri stic is deno ted by ( ~Lo, .:lRo)
and (LlL .., ~R,. ) . The probab ility of the r-round charac teristic Pa. is given by
(3.4)
assuming independence between rounds.
A pair of plainte xt s with XOR ~p = (~Lo, ~.Ro ) is defined as a right pair wit h
respect to a charact eristic Or, if all XOR pairs (a X;, ~Y; ) sati sfy Equat ion 3.3 for
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1 :S i :S r-. Otherwise. the pair is defined as a wrong pair . The right pair p roduces
(il Lr•.:lI4) from (.:lL o,~Eo ) with the probability Pn~ . It is obvious t hat. for the
given input XOR (.1Lo•.:.lEo). a right pair is more likely to occur with fewer number
oCchosen plainte xts if Pn~ is high . The objecti ve of differen tial cryptanalysis is to
find a char acte ristic with a relatively high probability.
The most useful charac teris t ic is one called an itera tive characte ris t ic which can
be concatenated wit h itself. The advantage of iterative characteristics is that we
can build an r-round characteristic for any lar ge r with a fixed reduction rate of
the probability for each additional round , while in non-it erative characteristics the
reduction ra te of the probability usual ly increases due to th e avalan che effect. The
z-round iterative charac teristic is illustrated in Figure 3.3, based on a non-zero XOR
input to the round function which may cause a zero XO R output with a relatively
high proba bility.
3.1.3 General Attack
In general. differential cry ptanalysis attempts to find the subkey bits used in the last
round of DES-like ciphers. Th is may be achieved if the cryptanalyst is awar e of a
characterist ic with a high probability for the first (R - 1) rounds, OR_l , and targets
the round R S-boxes with non- zero input XORs . In the at tack, the cryp tan al yst has
the knowledge of the exact values of t he in put pairs to the round function of the
last round , RR and Ril , which are the right halves of the ciphertexts. Although the
corresponding output XOR value of the round function is not known directly, when a
right pair occurs it can be derived by XORing the right half output XOR value of t he
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with a proba bility
p .0
Figu re 3.3: z-Round Iterat ive Characteristic
(R - 1) characteristic. ilRR_ 1, with the left half XQR value of the ciphertexts. ~LR'
Using the method described in Section 3.1.1 and detailed in [3}, we can get a set of
possible subkey values used in the last round. T he correct sub key value should be the
one occurring most frequent ly when a sufficient number of chosen plaintext pairs are
considered. Occurrences of the other possible subkey values should be fairly randomly
distributed. Some wrong pai rs can be directly discarded by checking whet her the right
half XOR values of the ciphertexts are equal to t he expected left half output XOR
values of the R - 1 characteristic, OR _I .
3.1. 4 Counting Scheme
A counting scheme is used to count the number of occurrences of all possib le sub key
values used in the last round and finally get the correct subkey values. The following
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definition is usable to evaluate a count ing scheme based on a characte rist ic.
Defini ti on 3.1 [3J The ratio between the number of right pairs and the average count
of the incorrect subkeys in a count ing scheme is called the signal to noise ratio of the
counting scheme and is denoted by SNR.
The magnitude of SNR is determined by the following fact ors:
- p, the differential probability of a characteristi c. Obviously, a high probabili ty
charact erist ic generat es several right pairs with a few chosen plaintext XOR
pairs .
- k , the number of subkey bits which we simultaneously count on. Counti ng on a
large numb er of subkey bit s simultaneously is helpful to identify th e correc t key
values and needs a small amount of data. However , it demands more memory,
which can make the attack impracti cal.
- "Y. the average count am ong all chosen plaintext XOR pair s. [f we can dist inguish
more wrong pai rs by the characterist ic, we need fewer counts to get the correct
key values . [0 general. it is difficult to determine the value of -v,
The signal to noise ratio of a counting scheme, SNR, is
SNR= ~., (3.5)
Furthermore , we define the number of chosen plaintexts, No , required to uniquely
identify the correct v-elue of the subkey as
No = !l
p
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(3.6)
where rJis the numbe r of right pairs required to uniquely de termine the correct value of
_thesubkey. When SNR is nigh. 1'/will be small. When SNR is low. 1'/will become lar ge.
C"nfortu nately, th e exact relationship between SNR and '1 is unknown. However. no
ma tte r wha t value SNR is. 11 shou ld be greater than one.
3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryp tanalysis [191 is a known plai ntex t attack which ext racts key information
by finding a statistical linear equation cons isting of plaintext , cip hertext. and key
terms only. In this section we intr od uce the basic idea of linear cryptanalysis.
3.2 .1 Basic Attack
Usually, the linear approximation has th e form of
where i l . . . , i ..., i. . .. , j". k" .. , Icc deno te fixed bit posi t ions of the pla intext P ,
ciphe rtext C . and key K . respective ly. Let P, be the proba bility with which Equa-
tion 3.7 holds. If IP, - 1/21 is large eno ugh and sufficient plaintext-ciphertext pai rs
are known. it is possible to use a hypothesis test to determi ne one equiva lent key
bit which is exp ressed by the XO R sum of the key bits on the right hand side of
Equation 3.7.
Let NL be the numbe r of given ran dom pla intexts . Matsui's Piling -up Lemm a
[191shows that one equivalent key bit of Equation 3.7 can be det ermined with 97.7%
confidence if NL sa t isfies
NL ::::: IFL - 1/21-2•
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(3.8)
3.2 .2 Linear Approximation of the S-box
Th e linear approximations of an $obox ar e found from the linear approx imation ta ble
of the Scbox. In the linear approximation table. each row corres ponds to a subset of
input bits of the >OOx. each column correspo nds to a subse t of out put bits of the
Scbcx . For a given m x n Scbox const ructed from a ma pping S : {Of I }'" _ {O. I }".
let t ing 0 E {Of I }'" and fJE {O, 1r . the linear approximation ta ble entry of the >OOx
corresponding to (0 .01) is defined as
L.4T (a,Pl = # {X E (O,l}mlaX = PS(X )} - 2m- ' (3.9)
where # denotes the cardinality of the set , and oX is defined as
where a.: and I . E {O.I }, 1 ::f i ::f m. It is str aig ht forwar d to not ice th a t
L.4T(a ,p) =2m - ' - d(aX.PS (X ))
where
(3 .10)
(3.11)
d(aX, pS(X )) =# {X E (O,llmlaX a>PS(X ) ~ l} . (3.12)
Equat ion 3.12 is t he Hamming distance between an affine boolea n funct ion a X and
a linear combinat ion of output bit boo lean functions of the Sebox OS(X).
The maximum ILAT (o,P H in the linear approximation table expresses the best
linear approximation of the S-box whose probabili ty p is defined as
Ip - 1/21 =max ILAT( a , P)I/ 2m •
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(3.13)
3.2.3 Linear Approximation of the Cipher
A linear approximation of a cipher is derived by XORing a num ber of linear approx -
imations of Scboxes such that any int erm ediate terms {i.e. terms are not plaintext.
ciphertext. or key terms) are cancelled . Assuming t ha t there are n such lineae ap-
proximations whose pro babilities are PI, .. , Pn, then Matsui's Piling-up Lemma shows
that the probability of the linear approximation of the cip her, PL , has
IF. - 1( 21=2'- ' flip,- 1(21 (3.14)
From Equat ion 3.8, it is obvious that l'h can be increased by dec reas ing IPc. -1/21.
The refore , Equation 3.14 suggests that selecting Scboxes which have Pi -+ 1/2 and
increasing the number of linear approximations of Scboxes involved in the overal l
linear approximation increases the cip her 's resistance to linear cryptanalysis.
3 .3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have described two of the most powerful cryptanalysis techniq ues,
different ial and linea r cryptanalysis in mor e detail. T he majo r concepts of XOR tab les
and characteristics in differential cry ptanalysis, and lineae approximations in linea r
cry ptan alysis were d iscussed. Their successfu l app lica tio n to t he DES encryption
algorit hm and many othe r proposed ciphers suggest t hat t hey provide two methods
with which jud ge the securi ty of private-key block ciphers.
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Chapter 4
ANew General Class of
Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
DES [241is nearing the end of its useful life . Afte r twenty years , it is now theoret ical ly
breakable by different ial [31 and linear cryptanalysis [191 , and practically breakable us-
ing special purpose hardw are [351. Many candidates are proposed for the replacement
of DES. Unfortunatel y, there is no obvious one with acceptab le speed and security.
In this chapter . we propose a new gene ral class of encryp tio n algorithms referred
to as an unbalanced CAST cipher , and describe its des ign cri teria and proced ure.
T he cryptographic analysis results will be given in la ter chapters.
4.1 Mot ivat ion
A successful cipher should have the following featu res.
- Security: T his is the mai n goal of t he cipher design . A successful cipher should
be resistant to all proposed cryptan a lyses, such as differential and linear crypt-
analys is, and be a potential survivo r in t he future when computing capability
increases. Fur thermore, there should exist a clear mathematical met hod so that
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the cryptographic strength of the cip her can be eas ily analyzed. and evaluated.
A com plicated encryption algo rithm is not guaranteed to have a strong crypto-
graphic strengt h.
- Effic ien cy; The re is usu ally a t rade-off between a higher level of sec urity and a
higher encryption/decrypt ion speed. A larger number of rounds usua lly provid es
a product cipher. such as SP:\' . with a higher security. but implies a lower speed .
A successful cipher shou ld have a high encry ption/decryption speed unde r a
certain level of security. an d allow users to exp licitly manip ulate the t rade-o ff
by selecti ng a variable nu mber of rou nds.
- Parameterization : Wit h t he increasing growth of telecom munications. enc ryp-
tion technology has been more and more ado pted by various applications. This
gives rise to the prob lem that a single encryption algo rithm may no t efficientl y
fit all appli cat ions since hardware and software envi ronmen ts may be totally
different. For example, g..bit , 16-bit. and 32-hit micro processors have differ-
ent da ta processing ab ilities. Personal computers, cellular phones. and points
of sales (POS) terminals have different memo ries available for an encry pt ion
algorithm. T herefore. a successful cipher shoul d be a family of encryption al-
gorithms characterized by a set of parameters .
- Eas e of Impleme ntation: DES. which was designed in the 1970's , is explicitly
a hard ware-oriented encryption algorithm. Its extensive use of pe rmutations is
inefficient in software, and its 6 x 4 S-boxes can not be efficiently im plemented
by modern computers. A new cipher would be most valua ble if it is easily
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imp lemented in both software and hardwa re.
The origin al CAST cipher [2] appears to be resistant to differential and linear
cryptanalysis [18. 14]. and possesses a num ber of desirab le cry ptog raph ic propert ies
such as avalan che [11. 12) and SAC [3-1]. It is easily implemented by software and has
a good encryption/decrypt ion performan ce on 32-bit mtcroprocesscrs. By using four
large 8 x 32 Scboxes, CAST eliminates the need of permuta tions. However, large S-
boxes require more memory to store their lookup tables. This might be unaccep tab le
in some implementations where the memory is extremely restricted, such as smart
card s.
Keeping the ab ove object ives in mind , we present a family of ciphers referred to as
unbalanced CAST ciphers, which employ the sam e type of Scbox and round fun ct ion
as the original CAST cipher, and have a variable amount of memory requirements
dependent on t he selection of different param ete rs .
4.2 Description of the Al gorithm
T he unbalanced CAST cipher is a product cipher which ite ra tes a round ope ra tion
R t imes. The round operat ion of t he general ciphe r may be concept ualized as in
Figure 4.1. Let N be the block size of the cipher . In the i- th round , an N-bit input
Bi is first split into thre e pieces, Le. Hi, and U;. L. is input to the round func tion F
XORed with an I-bit subkey K i , Hi is XORed wit h the out put of the round fun ction ,
and Ui bypasses the round function . Fina lly, Li , the XOR sum of the output of the
round function and Hi , and U, are processed by a rota t ion operation and result in
an N-bit output, B ;+ I . The round function has th e same structure as t he one of
35
B; (N-bi ts)
U,
(u-btts)
Hi
(h-bits)
K,
(I-bits)
L ,
(I-bi ts)
Rotation
B i+, (N-bits )
Figure 4.1: t- th Round O pera t ion of an Unbalan ced. CAS T Cip her
the original CAST ciph er shown in Figu re 2.3. Lett ing j\,f be th e number of m x n
S-boxes used in t he rou nd function wit h m < n, th e followin g re lationsh ips hold
Jf x m
.V- l - h (4.1)
where l is the number of bits of L; , h is the numbe r of bits of Hi , and u is the number
of bits of U;. Also l ~ h.
In general. the round operat ions of t he unbalanced CAST ciph ers can be char-
ec terized ent irely by the par ameters N . i.H , m, n and the rotat ion operat ion. For
example , the original CAST cipher can be charac terized by N == 64, M =4, m = 8,
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ri = 32, and a 32-bi t rotation in the form of swapping the two hal f blocks. Khafre
ca n be characte rized by N = 64. .\f = 1. m = 8. n = 32. and a ro tation of eigh t
and sixteen bits spec ified according to the round number. We refer to the ciphers as
unba lanced since l is not necessa ri ly equal to .V/ 2. A balanced CAST cipher. such as
the original CAST cipher, has l =n = .V/ 2 and 11.= O.
ITround functions from two cip hers , Cipher 1 and Cipher 2. are const ruct ed by
the same type of m x n Scboxes and the following equat ion holds:
(4.2)
...vhere the subscript is used to indicate the cipher number , then the two ciphers
may be conside red to be roughly equivalent in efficiency if the S-box table lookup is
cons ide red th e dom inant operation {i.e. assuming data rotation in CPU registers may
be igno red). For example, an B-round or iginal CAST cipher with four 8 x 32 Scboxes
may be considered roughl y equi valent in efficiency to a 32-round unbalanced CAST
cipher with one 8 x 32 S-box in efficiency . However, Equa tion 4.2 does not imp ly tha t
two ciphers may have an equ ivalent level of secu rity. Th is issue will be addressed in
later chap ters .
For current computer technology, t he blocksize 64 is quite convenient . T herefore ,
we choose 64 as the default value of N in t he remainder of the thesis.
4.3 Design Decisions
Based on the above st ruct ure, we now give some des ign decisions which mai nly focus
on Scbox. rotation operation. and round funct ion.
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4.3 .1 S-b ox
An m x n Scbox is a 2m.x n lookup tab le which maps m input bi ts to n output bits.
In SP:;';s and most DES- like ciphers. Scboxes are critically impo rtant to security since
they are the main components of nonline arity in the algorithm. Since the size of the
lookup table will exponentially increase with the increase of the value m. t he value m
sho uld be chosen to be small, say less than 10 . Converse ly, rbe value n can he chosen
to he lar ge since the size of the look up table increases linearly with n.
Th e original vers ion of CAST uses S-boxes based on ben t boo lean func tions [21.
To simplify the problem and benefit the statistical analysis, we co nside r ran doml y
generated S-boxes. Resea rch has shown tha t the re is no large cryp tographic difference
between these two kinds of S-boxes [221. To construct an m x n S-box one bit at a
time, a random number generato r is used whose outputs have either one or zero with a
probability of 1/2 . The ran domly generat ed 8 x 32 Sebox has following cryptographic
prope rties.
- Good Avalanche : Approximately hal f the output bits change when one input
bit changes [11, 12J.
- Bit Independence Criterion: Any two out put bits change independent ly when
any single input bit chan ges [341.
- EquiprobableX OR Distribution: In the XO R tab le, with a very high probab ility,
all entries are eit her 0 or 2.
- High Nonlinearity: T he S-box has a nonline ari ty at least 64 with a high probe-
bility [141.
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Usuall y. the values m and n are selected as an integer multiple of eigh t for ease of
implementation in modern computers. However, no t a ll Scboxes which have fewer
input bits than output bits are suitable to use in the unbalanced CAST ciphe rs. In
later chapters. we will give the anal ysis results.
4 .3. 2 Round Functi on
Differential and linear cryp tanalysis work on the principle of finding charact erist ics
and linear approximations with high probabilit ies on a single round . then casca ding
a sufficient numbe r of characteristics and linear approximations of different single
rounds in usefu l ways to at tack the whole cipher. It can be seen that adding sufficient
rounds to a DES-like cipher makes the cipher com putat ionally resistant to these
attacks. The disadvantage of th is approach is t hat the encryption/decryption speed
of the cipher is reduced. An alternate a pproach is to decrease the probabilities of
characteristics and linear approximations of an individual round by imp roving the
cryptographic properties of S-boxes. This makes the cipher potentially resistant to
differential and lineae cryptanalysis withou t losing the efficiency of t he algor ithm .
The di fference of the rou nd func tions of DES and t he original CAST cipher has
been illustrated in Figure 2.3. In general . DES is a hardware-oriented encryption
algorithm, while CAST is a software-oriented encryption algorithm . However , a rel-
atively efficient software implementa t ion of DES ca n eliminate tbe permutations by
regarding al16 x 4 S-boxes as 6 x 32 Scboxes. Then. the outputs of eight 6 x 32 S-boxes
are XORed together in th e same way as CAST, and the permutations need not be
app lied. In this way, DES and CAST can be viewed as having the round functions
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sim ilar in struc ture . The 8 x 32 Scbox of CAST has all output bits influenced by all
input bits, whereas the 6 x 32 Scbox of DES has twenty-eight output bits fixed at 0
and only four output bits influenced by all input bits since DES really just has the
6 x -I Sebox. This fea ture causes each outp ut bit of th e round function of CAST to
be influenced by all four 8 x 32 S-boxes, while the corresponding output bit of DES
is influenced by only one of eight 6 x 32 Sboxes. Th e simple comparison te lls us that
the round function of CAST sho uld be st ronge r th an tbe one of DES .
The unbalanced CAST ciph ers make use of the a bove proposed Scboxes and the
same round funct ion structure as CAST , but might have fewer S-boxes in the round
funct ion th an CAST to red uce th e memory requirement . In excha nge , more rounds
ace required to keep t he ciphe r at the same level of secu rity .
4.3.3 Rotat ion Operation
In the original CAST cipher. a balf block passes th rough the roun d functio n in each
round . Swapping th e two half blocks in each round makes each plaintex t bit pass
through the round func tio n once aft er two rounds. However, because tbe number
of input bits of the round func tion in an unbalanced CAST cip her can be less than
t he numbe r of out put bits , the swappi ng ope ratio n becomes not enough to efficiently
achieve completeness.
The primary purpose of the rotat ion ope ration is to bring all p laintext bits to
the input position of the ro und funct ion in as few rou nds as poss ible so that each
plaintext bit can influence every ciphertext bit in as few rounds as possib le. In
general , we assume tbat N is divisible by l . Then it takes NIl rounds to restore the
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plaintext bits to the ir original posi t ion and (SI' + 1) rounds for h 2:32 to achieve the
complet eness prcperry since t he last I bits ohhe plain text \\; 11 past through th e round
funct ion in t he (.Vll)-tb round and get influenced by themselves in the (.vII + l)- th
round . Howe,rer , if h < 32. it will ta ke a few mor e rounds to achieve completeness
since the last I bits of th e plain text will not be immediately influenced by themselves
in the (.VI I + 1)-th round. For exam ple, it takes thirt een rounds for an unbalanced
CAST cipher with one 8 x 16 S-box. or seven rounds for an unb alanced CAST cipher
with two 8 x 16 S-boxes to achieve the comp leteness property.
Based on Figur e -1.1. we propose a rotat ion ope ra tio n as well as the round oper-
at ion. which is effective in ens uring tha t ciphertext bits are influenced by plaintext
bits as quickly as possible. It is describ ed as the following :
1. B i is divided into two hal ves, the right hal f and the left half .
2. L" taken from the I least significant bits of the rigbt half , is input into th e F
round function whose output is XORed 'II1';tb H" which is the h least significan t
bits of th e left balf.
3. The righ t half is right cyclically rotated by I bits .
-l, Two halves are swapped to form B i + l .
Note tbat this operation is similar to . but slightly inconsistent with the conven ient
conceptual iza tio n of Figure 4.1. Th e swap ping of two half blocks is still necessary in
an unbalan ced CAST cipher because th e Hi XORed with the out put of th e round
function can be immediately b rought to the input position of the round functio n at
the next round , which has al l ciph ertext bits influenced faste r by all plaintex t bits .
The rota tion operat ion of th e 8-round unbalanced CAST ciph er wit h ;'-/ = 1. m = 8.
and n = 32 is illus tra ted in Tab le -l.L .....here a lett er represents an 8-bit da ta block.
Rnd Left Half Right Half
P, .4 B C D E F G H
1 A B C D E F G H
2 H E F G .4 B C D
3 D .4 B C H E F G
4 G H E F D .4 B C
5 C D .4 B G H E F
6 F G H E C D A B
7 B C D .{ F G H E
8 E F G H B C D .4
C, .4 B C D E F G H
Table -l.I: Rotation Opera tion for an un ba lanced CAST Cipher with M = 1, m = 8,
andn= 32
T he data to the right side of the dou ble vert ical lines is input to the round function
whose four byte ou tput data is XORed with the left half block. After every eight
round s tile data bits ar e restored to their original position. It takes nine rounds for
the cipher to be complete.
Th ere are two special cases in which the swapping is not necessary, the cipher
with J [ = 2, m = 8, an d n = 48. and the cipher with :\f = I, m = 8, and n = 56.
Both cases have N = l + h. where l < 32 and h > 32. In the first case, 1= 16 and it
ta kes four rounds before the cipher is complete; in the second case, l = 8 and it takes
eight rounds before the cipher is complete. The large num ber of output hits of t he
S-boxes will make such ciphers suita ble for 54-bit processor implementations.
The above rotation operation is a gener alized one. A more efficient rotation op-
eraticn may he used in a specific imp lementa tion , depending on the structure of the
microprocessor and its registers. For example, Kba fre [211, which targets 32-bi t micro-
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processo rs with 16-bit regis ters . uses a comb ina tion of eight and sixteen bit rotations
to increase its ope ration speed. Howe....er. the main design principle rema ins same.
4 .4 Concl us io n
We have presented a new class of encryption algorithms referred to as unbalanced
CAST ciphers. which em ploy the same type of S-box and round function as t he orig-
inal CAST ciphe r. By choosing different parameters, the cipher can have a var iable
amount of memory requirements, which is preferred in some imp lemen tations. VIle
have also described the genera l ope rat ion of th e cipher , and discussed the des ign
decisions of the Scbox, the round function, and the rotat ion operation in detail.
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Chapter 5
Differential Cryptanalysis of
Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
In this chapter. we exami ne the resistance of unbalanced CAST ciphers to differential
cryptanalysis [31. An anal ysis of the distribution of entries in the XOR table of the
round function is first developed . Then two methods of cryptanalysis are gi....en , based
on Biham's attack [5) and on iterative characteri st ics. Sin ce it is impossible to anal yze
all parameters. we only select a set of typical values as a basis for demonstrating the
anal ysis technique and inves t igat ing the effect of parameter changes .
.-\S indicated in Sect ion ..1..3.1. the 8 x 32 S-box has some good cry ptographic
properties. and is utilized by the or igi nal balan ced CAST cipher (M = 4. m =8. a nd
n =32) which bas been analyzed in [18, H I. In th is cha pter, we will mainly analyze
unbalanced CAST ciphers with m = 8, n =32 and .\J = 1 or 2. Both ciphers require
only 1/4 and 1/2 memory of the origin al CAST cipher. respectively. For furthe r
red uct ion of the memory requirement. ciphers with parameters of m = 8 and n = 16
with M = 1 or 2, and parameters of m =-1 and n = 32 with Al = 1, 2, 4 or 8 will also
be investigated . We will also examine the cipher with j\tI = 1, m = 8, and n = 56
. z
Figure 5.1: XO R Flow in the Round Function of Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
since it is suitable for 54-bit processor implementations.
5. 1 Distribution of Entries in the XOR Table
Lee, et al [18] have already given the analysis of the distribution of entries in the
XOR table of the round function of the original CAST cipher. The method can be
directly used in our analysis.
[0 orde r to gene ralize the analysis, the round function of an unba lanced CAST
cipher which is combined by ,U m xn S-boxes is shown in Figure 5.1. If we denote the
inputs of the Scboxes as XI , . .• X M and the corresponding outputs of the S-boxes as
1" 11 . .. Y'd' . then tbe output of the round {unction, Z, is given by
(5.1)
For the complete rou nd function. given input XOR value ~X = [.:lX I •..• .:lX M ],
the outp ut XOR value .:lZ is given by
L'.Z~p'L'.y.
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(5.2)
where ~Xi is the bit-wise XOR of two input values. X, and X; . to th e S-box S" i.e..
.:lX i = Xi e X; . Also, ~}': = l :el:" and ~Z = Z eZ" .
We define .VZ (.:lX ) as the numbe r of S-boxes that have non-zero input XOR
values. Then . if .VZ(~X ) = .'of. all the entries in the XOR cable corresponding to
that .:lX will be multiples of 2M . This is because all tbe following 2M / 2 input pairs
have the same input XOR value .:lX and tbe same output XOR value .J.Z :
{XI,X" . .• XM _I,X.U} {Xi .Xi· ,. , X.W_I, X.\, }
{X t, X" .. , XM_1, X .\, } {Xi . Xi , . . . X,W_l'XM }
{X I,X" . .• X .\f_I ,X.\f} {Xj ,X; , . . . XM _"X.\,}
{X " X " . .• X .W_I,Xit} {Xj , Xi , ." X M_t ,X ,\f}
{X " Xi , . . . X .\r _I,Xit} {Xi , X, • . . ,X.\f _"XM}
Since each of above pairs cont ributes an ent ry of Z in th e XOR table corresponding
to the row .J.X and the column ~Z, the 2M / 2 pairs will resul t in an entry of 2M in
the XOR table. In a sim ilar way, if .VZ(.ilX) = i. all the entries in the XOR tab le
correspondi ng to that ~X will be multiples of Z". (M- . ) . 2' , Th is is the result of the
fact that the re are (AI - i) m x n Scboxes that have zero input XO R values and each
of the S-boxes has 2'" input pairs that have a zero input XOR value and a zero outp ut
XOR value.
For any m x n S-box, Si, any input XOR value ~Xi has 2= /2 = 2"' -1 unordered
pairs of (X i, Xi e ~Xi) ' If each of these inp ut pairs gives rise to a distinct output
pair , tben the outp ut XOR .:lY; can take at most 2".-1 disti nct values . For the
round function , suppose tha t Nt m x n S-boxes are rando mly generated and mut ually
indepe ndent , then the out put XOR ~Z can be anyone of the 2n possible values
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with equal probability. wbeu .VZ( J.X) = J,l. the distribution of th e out put XORs
for a give n input XOR is equivalent to tossing (2"'- 1).\1 balls randomly into 2" bins
with each ball having a weight of 2.11 • When .VZ(~X) = i, the distribution of the
output XORs for a given input XOR is equivalent to tossing (2".- t), balls randomly
into 2" bins with each ball having a weight of 2".(M- ' I . 2' . We wish to det erm ine the
distribution of the balls in the bins in order to exam ine the distribution of entries in
t he XOR table.
Let 8 11; be a random variable represen t ing the number of bins having k bal ls when
a balls are tossed randomly into b bins . It has been shown that if a and b increase in
a way such that bV( i) 1I; remai ns bounded. we can get the expected number of bins
with k balls from
(5.3)
where e is the natural logarithm base.
Consider the round funct ion with four 8 x 32 Scboxes. If NZ(DX ) = .t. then
a =2u . b =2J2 , and E(Bl: l will be the expected numbe r of !).Z values each of which
has XOR entry of 24. k for a particular .:lX . Similarl y, if N Z(~X) =3, then a =22(.
b = 232 , and £(811;)will be the expected number of .:lZ values each of which has XOR
entry of 211 • k for a part icular D.X , and so on. The expected dis t ribut ion of entry
values in the XOR table is display ed in Table 5.1.
For the round functions with one or two 8 x 32 S-boxes [Le., for ciphe rs with
J'[ = 1 or J,f = 2), their distributions of ent ry values in the XOR ta ble can also be
immediately derived from the Table 5.1. For examp le, the distribution table of the
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.V Z (t>X) k Entry Value Number of Entries
"
1 2 ·1 2" ·"'l
"
2 2 . 2 2
"
3 2 · 3 2 .."
" "
2 · 4 ;2" -JOol
"
5 2 · 5 2"
"
6 2 · 6 2-' "
"
7 2 · 7 2
3 1 2" · 1 2N "
3 2 2 . 2 2
3 3 2" ·3 2-' "
2 1 2 · 1 2
2 2 2"·2 2
Tab le 5.1: Dist rib ution of Ent ry Values for a Particular .,;lX in the XOR Table for
.\1 = ·t m =8. and n ::= 32
round func t ion with two 8 x 32 S-boxes begins from ;VZ(~X) = 2. All the numbers
in Table 5.1 can be direc t ly q uoted except tha t the entr y values should be divided
by 2m { .\f - i ) ::= 216 . It can be seen that for Al = 1 and 2, tbe expected. number of bins
which have the number of balls greater t han 1 for a particu lar ~X is less t han or
equal to 2- 5 • which is so sma ll th at all tbe bins can be conside red to bev-e eit her 0 or
1 bal l. In ot her words. for M = 1 and 2. the maximum likelihood entry values for a
particular ~X are 2 and 4, respectively.
The expected distributio n of entry values for a particul ar LlX in the XOR table
of the round functi on with two 8 x 16 S-boxes is dis played in Tabl e 5.2. When
"8
_VZ(~X ) k Ent ry Value :;.iumber of Entries
2 1 2 - 1 2
2 2 2 · 2 2"~
2 3 2 . 3 ?.
2 • 2 .
2 .tX>
2 5 2 · 5 2
...§ijf----=;:'--'.~=----+-----==--- -
Table 5.2; Distr ibu t ion of En t ry Values for a Part icular .:.lX in t he XOR Tab le for
M =2, m ::: 8, and n ::: 16
NZ(~X) = 2, it is very likely for a particular .:lX that th ere is a bin having four
balls since the expected values are greate r than 1. T her efore. th e probability that
there exist entry values of -I, 8, 12, and 16, is high in the XOR tab le of the round
function .
T he expected distribution of entry values for a particular ::::'X in the XOR tab le
of t he round function with eight -I x 32 S-boxes is disp layed in Table 5.3. For the
rou nd funct ions wit h .~[ ::: I , 2. and 4. it is very un likely for a particular ::::'X t hat
there is a bin having k balls. where k: > 1. In other words. the maxi mum entry values
for a particula r .;lX are 2. 4, and 16. respecti vely.
In the following secti on we will utili ze th e distr ibution of entry values in t he XOR
ta ble to derive t he likelihood of occu rre nce of iterat ive char acte ristics.
5 .2 It erative Chara cterist ics
T he concept of an itera t ive characteristic has been descri bed in Sect ion 3.1.2. Th e
2-ro und ite rative characteristic. wh ich is shown in Figur e 3.3. is tbe basic str ucture
.9
_YZ(~X) k Entry Value Number of Ent ries
8 1 25 · 1 2;u·~
8 2 2 - 2 2
8 3 2 -3 2
8 4 2' -4 2-'"
8 5 2 -5 o-
7 1 2" - I 2
7 2 2 - 2 2
7 3 2" - 3 2
7 4 211·4 2-
,
Table 5.3 : Distribution of Entry Values for a Particular ~X in the XOR Table for
JJ = 8, m = 4, and n =32
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used for differential cryptanalysis of the full 16-round DES. Lee. Heys and Tavares
[18] have found tha t the best 2-roun d iterat ive characteris t ic of t he original bala nced
CAST cipher (i.e. .\[ = 4. m = 8. and 11 = 32 ). bas the probability of 2-14 • In this
section . we statistically ana lyze the likelihood of occurrence of iterative characterist ics
for unba lanced CAST ciphers.
5.2.1 Likelihood of Occurrence of It era t ive C haracteristics
If t here is a zero output XOR caused by a non-zero input XOR with a differential
probability for a round function . there exists an N Ii -round iterative char acterist ic
for that unbalanced CAST cipher. Table 5.4 gives an example of a possib le 8-round
it erat ive characterist ic for an unbalanced CAS T cipher with Al = 1, m = 8. and
11 = 32. The letter .-t. repr esents a non-zero XOR value and the plain text XOR
Rnd Left Half Right Half Output XOR Probability
t>.P .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0
I
- 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0~ I0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 07 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 p
t>.C .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab le 5.4: 8-Roun d Iterative Characteristic for an Unbalanced CAST Cipher with
A1=1,m=8,andn =32
difference is given by AOOOOOOO. The XOR values to the right side of the do uble
vert ical lines represent input XORs to the round function, while the output XOR
column represents the output XORs of the round function. The p is a probability
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wit h which the input XOR value of .-l.may cause t he out put XOR value of 0000 in
th e XOR table o f th e roun d funct ion.
Xote that the charac teris tic is bas ed on th e rotat ion opera tio n given in Sec-
tion 4.3.3. Th e only non-ze ro XOR byte, A, does not appear as an input to the
round func tio n unt il roun d 8. Meny other ite rative char acterist ics exist and will be
descr ibed in t he next sectio n. Our objec tive is to find an iterative characte ristic with
reaso nable likeliho od of occurri ng given an appropri ate in put XOR .
In Sectio n 5. 1, we predict the d istri bu tion of ent ry values for a particular .:lX
in the XOR ta b le wit h N Z(~X) = i . where i = 1, · · · , .1;1. Now we pred ict the
expec ted. number of entries in t he XO R tab le which can be used. to configu re an
ite rative characteristic . Denote Ne( tlX,~Z) as an entry in the XOR table of the
round func tion cor respo nd ing to an input XQR, ~X, and an output XOR, ~Z.
T hen, .V.d~X. 0) represents an entry correspo nding to a parti cular non -zero input
XOR value, ~X . with N Z(~X) = i and a zero out pu t XOR value. ::::.Z =O. \Ve also
denote u as an ent ry value, which has
u = 2m.(M- .l ·2' ·k (5.4)
where k =0.1 ,2" '. Let ti ng '\ " be the probability with which .Ve(~X, 0) = u with
.VZ (d X ) = i , t hen
>. _ E{B.i
,, - 2" . (5.5)
[f we assume t ha t the occu rrence of .6.Zs for different ~XS are inde pe nden t. since
there are totally ( .~[ ) . (2'" - 1); non -zero .:lX s with NZ(tlX) = i , t he expec ted
num ber of entri es in the XOR ta ble which bev-e Ne( .o.X,O) = u wit h NZ(ilX) = i ,
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.vzP.X ) v A.
""
P
4 2 . [ 2 2.-l8 x 10 2-"
4 2 -2 2 i .76 x 10 2
4 2 · 3 2-"" 1.61 x 10 2-"
4 2 .. 2 2.52 x io 2
• 2 · 5 2-"·00 3.16 x 10 2-'"
• 2 · 6 2 3.29 x 10- 2-
4 2 · 7 2-'· 2.94 x 10 2-
3 2 . [ 2- 3.24 x 10 2
3 2 · 2 2-~oo 7.90 2-"
3 2 · 3 2 1.29 x 10 2
2 2 · 1 2- [A9 2-
2 2 · 2 2 2.84 x 10- 2
-
Table 5.5: Likelihood of Occurrence of Iterative Characterist ics for an u nbalanced
CAST Cipher with AT= 4, m = 8. and n = 32
/l". is given by
(5.6)
If there is an Se(.::l X , O) = u with :VZ (.:lX ) = i . where 1) oF a or k -#0, then there
exist s an iterat i..re characte ristic with a differential probability of p given by
(5.7)
Table 5.5 gives the likelihood of occurrence of iterative characteristics for a bal -
anced CAST cipher with I'v!= 4. m = 8, and n = 32. It can be seen that it is highly
unlikely (J..l" = 3 .04 x lO- s for u = 225 ) to construct an iterat ive characteristic with a
differential probabi lity of 2- 7 for which only one of four S-boxes has an entry corre-
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spe nd ing to a non-zero input XOR and a zero output XOR in its XOR table. In fact.
it is not difficu lt to apply a screening process to discard any such S-boxes . However. it
is very likely (Jlv = 1.49 for v = 2 L8 ) t ha t it is possible to const ruct an iterarive char-
acteristic with a differential probability of 2 - '~ . It seems impossible to discard such
S-boxes to prevent this ite rat ive char acteris t ic from occurring by a screening process
since the likelihood of occurrence is high. Furthermore, for any two of four S-boxes
in the round function . 216 • 214 = 230 output XOR pairs need to be checked . Totally
( ~ ) . 230 ::::: 232 6 output XOR pairs need to be checked for the round function. The
work load of the screening process is heavy. Therefore, it is assumed that the best
it erat ive charac teristic for a balan ced CAST cipher with ;I. I = -I, m = S, and n = 32
is a 2-round itera tive characteris tic with diffe rential probability of 2- 1-1. One of such
itera tive characteristi cs is illust rated in Tab le 5.6, where two bytes, .4.and 8. have
Rnd Left Half Right Half Output XOR Probability
:lP .4 B 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .4 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 .4 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 2- 1-1
:lC .4 B 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab le 5.6: 2-Round Iterative Charact erist ic for a Balanced CAST Cipher with .\1 = 4.
m = 8. and n = 32
non-zer o input XOR values, and result in a zero output XOR value in t he XOR tabl e
of the round funct ion.
Similar ly, for an unbalanced CAST cipher with M = 2, m =8, and n =32, sup-
pose that we have discarded all Seboxes with which a 4-round iterat ive cha racte ristic
with a differential probability of2- 7 can be constructed. Then. A, = (27 )2/ 2 32 =2- 18•
and ~4 = (28 _ 1 )2 ' ..\4 :::::2- 2. The refore, when we randomly generate a round function
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combined by two 8 x 32 Scboxes, the expected numbe r of entries in the XOR tabl e
which sa tisfy .VEC~X. O) = 4 is abou t 0.25. This entry can be used to const ruct a
-t-round iterat ive characteristic wi th a different ial probabili ty of 2- 1.- as in Table 5.7.
We assum e th a t th e best it era tive characteristic for an un bal anced CAST ciphe r with
Rnd Left Half Right Half Ou tput XOR Pr o bab ility
.:,. p .~ B 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .~ B 0 0 0 Of 0 0 0 0 02 0 0 0 0 .4 B 0 0 0 0 0 03 0 0 .~ B 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0
~ 0 0 0 0 0 o .4 B 0 0 0 0 2- 14
:lC .~ B 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.7: -l-Round Iterative C harac terist ic for an Unbalanced CAST Cipher with
.\1 = 2. m = 8. and n = 32
.\-1 = 2. m = 8. and n = 32 is a a-round it erat ive characteristic with a different ial
probability of 2- 14 . Screeni ng a pair of Scboxes to pre vent the characteris tic from
occu rrenc e would be possi ble al tho ugh ti me-cons uming since about 230 XOR pairs
woul d ha ....e to be examined .
A.n unbalanced CAST cipher wit h J{ = 1. m = 8. and n = 32 has ..\1 = 21/ 2"'" =
2-~ . and Jl1 = (2' - t) ·..\1 :::;:: 2- 11• T he expected num ber is so smal l t hat it wo uld be
difficult to find an 8- round iterativ e ch aract eristi c as in Tabl e 5.-1wit h a differential
prob ability of p = 2-1 when we randomly gene rate an 8 x 32 S-box.
Table 5.8 gi....es the likelihood of occurrence of ite ra tive characteri st ics for an un-
balanced CAST cipher with M = 2. m = 8. and n = 16. [t can be seen th at the
expected number of ent ries in the XOR tab le which can be used to co nst ruct a-r ound
iterative cha ract eri stic with a differential probabilit y of 2- 1 is large . ab out 1. Even
if we discard such S-b oxes by using the screening process. the 4-round itera t ive char -
cVZ(~X)
"
x, ~o P
2 2 · 1 2 1.27 x 10 2-
2 2 · 2 2-~ 1.58 x 10" 2
2 2 ·3 2 o n 1.32 X 10 2-'"
2 2' . ~ 2- ,, ·n 8.2 4 2- "
2 2 · 5 2 4.12 X 10 2
2 2 · 6 2- 1.72 X 10- 2-
2 2 · 7 2 ' 00 6.13 X 10- 2-
1 2 · 1 2- 9.94 X 10- 2-'
1 2 · 2 2- 9.71 X 10 2-
Table 5.8: Likelihood of Occurrence of Iterative Characteristics for an Unbalanced
CAST Ci pher with Al = 2, m = 8, and n = 16
acr eristic with a d ifferential probability of 2- 12 can be easily found . and can not be
screened beca use the likelihood of occurrence is to o high , with t he expected number
of entries of ab out 8.24. Therefore , we assume that the best iterative characteristic
for an unbalanced CAST cipher with .\l = 2, m = 8, and n = 16 is a 4-round iterative
cha ract eris t ic with a differen t ial probability of 2- 12 , which is sb.own in Table 5.9 .
Rnd Left Half Right Half Ou tpu t XOR P robability
,:,.p .~ B 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 A B 0 0 0
or
0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 .~ B 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 A B 0 o 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 o A B 0 0 2- 12
"C . B 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab le 5.9: 4-Round Iterative Characterist ic for an Unbalanced CAST Cipher with
1 4 =2, m =8, and n = 16
An 8-rou nd ite rative characterist ic is illustrated in Table 5.10 for an unba lanced
CAST cipher with M = I , m =8, and n = 16. Th e cipher has A2= 21{216 =2- 9 ,
and P2 = (28 - 1).>'2 :::::: 0 .5, which is much larger than the one of an unbalanced. CAST
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Rnd Left Half Right Half Output XOR Probability
"),.p .~ a a a a a a a
1 .~ a a a a a a a a a
2 a a a a .~ a a a a a
3 a .~ a a a a a a a a
~ a a a a a .~ a a a a
5 a a A a a a a a a a
6 a a a a a a .~ a a a
7 a a a .~ a a a a a a
8 a a a a a a a .~ a a 2- '
"),.c .~ a a a a a a a
Table 5.10: 8-Round Iterat ive Characteristic for an Unbalan ced C AST Ci pher with
.\! = 1, m =8, and n =16
cipher with Jf = I , m = 8. and n =32 . The screeni ng process is st ill applicable to
disca rd such Scboxes which can be used to cons t ruct an 8-round iterat ive characteristic
since tbe num be r of entries in the XOR ta ble of an 8 x 16 S-box is only 28 • 27 = 2(5.
Tab le 5.11 gives the likelihood of occurrence of iterati ve characteristics for a bal-
anced CAST cipher with At = 8, m = 4, and n = 32. The scen ario is quite sim ilar
to the one of a balanced CAST ciph er with ~V/ =4. m = 8, and n =32. It is highly
unlikely to construct an ite rative char ac teristi c with differentia l probabilities of 2- 3 or
2- 6 • for which on ly one or two of eight S-boxes have an entry corresponding to a non-
zero input XOR and a zero output XOR in its XOR tab le. Although the likelihood
of occurrence of an ite rative characteristic with a differential probability of 2- 9 is not
low enough, about 0.02, it is no t diffic ult to apply a scree ning process to di sca rd any
such 5-boxes. The work load is to check totally ( ~ ) .2 12 • (23 ) 3 ::::::226 .8 output XOR
pairs for the rou nd funct ion . However . it is very likely (Jlv ==3.38 for v == 220) to
construct an iterative char ac terist ic with a di fferen tial prob ability of 2-12 _ To discard
such 5-boxes to prevent this iterative characteristic from occurring by the sc reening
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.vZ(~X) o x,
". P8 2 . [ 2 9.97 x 10 2-
8 2 · 2 2- ,. 1.95 x 10 2·n
8 2 · 3 2'''''' 2.54 x 10 2==
8 2 ., 2 2..18x 10 2
8 2 · 5 2""" 1.93 x 10- 2""
T 2 ., 2' ' 00 6.6 7 x 10 2'"
T 2"·2 2'''''' 1.63 X 102 2· M
7 2 · 3 2' 2.65 x 10 2
7 2" . , 2'''''' 3.24 x 10 2'"
6 2 . [ 2 1.95 x 10 2
6 214 · 2 2·,,·00 5.94 x 10- 2'"
6 2 ·3 2' 1.21 x 10 2
5 2" .' 2 ' .00 3.24 x 10 2'"
5 2 · 2 2' 1.24 x 10 2
3 i 223_l ' 2 - 1300 i 2.25 x 10-2
,
2
,
3 2" ·2 2'''·00 1.34 x 10- 2'
2 2 . ! 2' 9.39 x 10 2
.
Table 5.11: Likelihood of Occurrence of Iterat ive Characteristics for an Unbalanced
CAST Ciphe r with ,'of= 8, m = 4, and n = 32
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process, the work load is to check totally ( ~ ) · 2 (6 . (23 ) 4 ~ 234 . ( ou tp ut XOR pairs
for the round function. Therefore. we ass ume that the best iterative characteristic
for a balanced CAST cipher with J! =8, m = 4. and n = 32 is a 2-round iterat ive
charac te ristic with a di fferent ial probability of 2 - (2 , which is a tit tle higher tha n the
one of a balanced CAST cip her wit h Al = 4. m =8. and n =32. One of such iterat ive
charac te ristics is illustrated in Table 5.6 , in which the differential probability shou ld
be 2- 12 ,
For an unbalanced CAST cipher wit h AI = 4, m = 4, and n = 32, suppose
that we have discarded all S-boxes with which a 4-round ite rative characteristic with
differential probabilities of 2- 3,2-6, or 2- 9 can be constructed. Then. A(6 = 212/2 32 =
2- 20, and Jll6 = (24 - 1)4 , A. ::::: 2- 4.4. Then, when we randomly generate a round
func tio n from four 4 x 32 S-boxes , the expected num ber of ent ries in t he XOR table
which satis fy N.d~X.O) = 16 is about 0.05. This entry can be used to cons t ruct a
+-round iterative characteristic with a differential pro bability of 2 - (2 as in Table 5.7.
weassume that the best iter ative characteristic for an unbalanced CAST cipher with
.\J = -t. m = 4. and n = 32 is a -l-roun d iterat ive characteristic wit h a different ial
probability of 2- 12 , al though it may be possible to screen such S-boxes.
An unba lanced CAS T cip her with Af = 2. m = 4, and n =32 has ).. = (23)2/2 32 =
2- 26 , and Jl4 = (24 - 1) 2 , '\2 :::::2- 18.2• Th e expec ted number is so smal l that it would
be difficult to find an 8-round ite rative characteris tic wit h a differential probability
of 2- 6 as in Table 5.4 when we ran domly generate two 4 x 32 S-boxes.
We do not consider an un balanced CAST ciphe r with }vI = 1, m = 4, and n =32
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since one 4 x 32 S-box has a t most 2~ different 32· bit o utput vectors. Any linear com -
binat ions of such 2" vectors can Dot produce a1l23 'l d iffere nt 32-b it v'ectors. Hence, the
round function is not surjective, and the cipher is trivially brea kable using P reneel's
basic att ack described in Section 2.6.3.
Since the numbe r of outp ut bi ts of an 8 x 56 S-box is la rge r than the one of an
8 x 32 Scbox, it is mo re difficult to find an B-round itera t ive characteristic with a
d ifferent ial probab ility of 2- 1 for an un balance d CAS T cip her with ;'t,l = 1, m = 8,
and n = 56.
F inally, a summ ary of the likelihood of occu rrence of ite ra ti ve characteristics for
unbalanced CAST cip hers with some typ ical parameters are list ed in Table 5. 12.
The difficulty level of which S-boxes could be scree ned dep ends on the likelihoo d of
occu rre nce of iterative characteristics and the work load of screening. We can conclude
by noting th at iterative cha racteristics can be prevent ed for unbalanced CAS T cip hers
with one 8 x 56 Scbox. wit h one 8 x 32 S-box, and wit h two 4 x 32 Scboxes .
5 .2.2 P seudo-Iterative C haracteristics
By looking at Tab le 5,12, we can find that it seems diffic ult for an unbalan ced CAST
cip her with one 8 x 32 S-box to have an itera tive characteristic const ructed by an
entry of NE:(~X.O) in t he XOR tab le of the round function. Even if the XO R table
of t be rou nd funct ion has an entry of NE:(~X.O) t be likeli hood of occurre nce of this
entry is no t so high that we can not discard S-boxes lead ing to such round functions
by t he screening pro cess . T herefor e, we believe that di fferent ial cryptanalysis of the
unbal anced CAST cipher whose round funct ion is cons t ru cted by one 8 x 32 S-box by
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S-box Differential Notes
m x n JI Probab ility
8 x 56 I 2- Likelihood: ~ 4.53 x 10-
(8 Rounds ) S-boxes could be easi ly screened
8 x 32 I 2-' Likelihood: ~ 7.63 x 10
(8 Roun ds ) S-boxes could be easily sc reened
2 2- Likelihood: ~ 0.25
(4 Rounds ) S-boxes could be screened
4 2- Likelihood: ~ 1.49
(2 Rounds ) Scboxes might be screened with difficulty
8 x 16 1 2- Likelihood: IJ - 0.50
(8 Rounds ) S-boxes could be screened
2 2- Likelihood: ~ 8.28
(4 Roun ds) S-boxes might be screened wit h difficulty
4 x 32 2 2- Likelihood: ~ 3.32 x 10
(8 Rounds) S-b oxes could be easily screened
4 2-" Likelihood: ~ 0.05
(4 Rounds) S-boxes could be screened
8 2 Likelihood: ~ 3.38
(2 Rounds) Scboxes might be screene d with difficulty
Table 5.12: Summary of Likelihood of Occurre nce of Ite r at ive Cha racte rist ics
using the iterative characteristic described in Section 5.2.1 is not a real th reat. In this
section . we investigate the pro ba bility that there exist ot her kinds of charact erist ics
similar in nature to iterative char acterist ics, but not strictly iterat ive. We refer to
these char acteristics as pseudo-iterati ve characteristics .
Table 5.13 disp lays an 8-round pseudo-itera t ive cha racteristic for an unbalanced
CAST ciphe r with M =1, m = 8. and n = 32, where any letter represents a non-zero
byte of XOR values. Al = A. E9alt and B( = B E9ht • The different ial proba bility
of th is characteristic is 2- 14 _ In terms of the charact erist ic, the XOR tab le of the
round function must have entries of NE(B ,OOOadan d Ng(Al>bIOOO) at t he same
time. Furthermo re. if t here are ent ries of NE( Bt. OOOat) and NE (A ,btOOO) in the
6\
Rnd Left Half Right Hair Output XOR Probab ility
~p A 0 0 0 a 0 0 0
1 .4 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 a 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 .{ 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0
{ 0 0 a 0 0 .{ 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 .4 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 a 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 0
t 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 n, 2-'
8 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 A, b, 0 0 0 2-'
~C .{ , 0 0 0 a, 0 0 0
Table 5.13: Firs t 8-Round Pseduo-Iitera tive Char acteristic for an Unbalanced CAST
Cipher with M = 1, m = 8, and n = 32
XOR table, the characteristic can be extended to a 16-round iterative characteristic
with a d ifferent ial probability of 2- 28 •
The XOR table has totally (28 - 1) 27 ::::: 215 non-zero entries. Suppose that th ey
are randomly generated and inde pendent. T hen tb e proba bili ty that there is at leas t
one entry of the form of XOOO in the XOR tab le is 1 - (1 - ~)2LS ::::: 2- 9 • where X
is a non-zero byte. Similarly , tbe probability tbat there is at least one entry of the
form o f OOOX in tbe XOR table is a bout 2-9 . The probability that there is at leas t
one pair of entries of the forms of XOOOan d OOOX in tbe XOR tab le is approximately
(2- 9 ) 2 = 2- 18 • Furt hermore, the likelihood of the actual entries required for the
pseudo-i te rative characteristics is even smaller. Hence, it is ext remely unlikely for
the cip her to have the charac terist ic of Tab le 5.13 or the result ing 16-round iter at ive
characteristic.
Ta ble 5.14 displays another 8-round pseudo- iterative char acteristic for an un ba l-
anced CAST cipher wit h ;'-/ = 1, m = 8, and n = 32. T he differential probability
of this characteristic is 2- 21• The cha racteristic requ ires th at the XOR table of the
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Red Left Half Right Half Output XQR Proba bility
:,p
.4 a 0 0 C 0 0 0
1 .4 a 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
., 0 C 0 0 .4 a 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 .4 a 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 C 0 0 .4 a 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 .4 a 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 C 0 0 A a 0 0 0 cr 2- '
7 a 0 0 .4 0 0 0 C, b, 0 0 a, 2- '
8 C, 0 0 0 a, 0 0 .4 , c, 0 0 0 2- 7
:' C A , a, 0 0 C, 0 0 0
Table 5.14: Second 8-Round Pseudo-Iterative Characteristi c for an Unbal anced CAST
Cipher with JI;[ = 1, m = 8, and n = 32
round funct ion must have entries of the forms of OOOX, XOOX. and X OOO at the
same time. The probability that the XOR table has these entries is approximately
2- 9 .2 - 1 .2 - 9 = 2- L9 • which is still very small. Further, tbe probability of actual
entries required for an pseudo-iterat ive characteristic is much smal ler.
Table 5.15 displays third 8-round pseudo-i terative characterist ic for an unbalanced
CAST cipher with J,J = 1, m = 8 , and n = 32. The differentia l probability of this
Red Left Half Right Half Output XOR Probability
:, p
.4 a 0 0 C D 0 0
1 .4 a 0 0 C D 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 I
2 0 C D 0 .4 a 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 .4 a 0 0 C D 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 C D 0 .4 a 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 .4 a 0 0 C D 0 0 a, b, 2-'
6 D 0 0 C 0 0 .4, a, d, 0 0 C, 2- 7
7 a, 0 0 A, D, 0 0 C, b., 0 0 a, 2- 7
8 C, D, 0 0 a, 0 0 A, c, d, 0 0 2- '
:,c .-h a, 0 0 C, D, 0 0
Table 5.15: Third 8-Round Pseudo-Iterative Characterist ic for an Unbalanced CAST
Cipher with .'lif= 1, m = 8, and n = 32
characterist ic is 2- 28 for eigh t rounds. The characteristic requires that the XOR table
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of the round funct ion must have two en tries of the forms ofOOXX and -'<.\"00 and
two entries of the form of X OOX. The probab ility that t he XQR tab le has these
entries is ap proximately (2 - 1 )~ = 2-~ . T he probab ility of occu rrence of the pseudo-
ite rat ive characteris tic in Table 5.15 is much higher than the prev ious tWO tables.
alt hough it is still an upper bound and the rea l probabili ty ....ill be (ower since it
requires specific relatio nships between t he non-zero bytes of the out put XOR of th e
rou nd funct ion. However, since th e likelihood of occurrence of Tab le 5.15 is not low
enoug h, we conclud e that an 8-round pseudo-iterat ive characte ristic wit h a differen tial
pro bab ility of 2- 28 for an unbal an ced CAST cip her with one 8 x 32 Scbox is possib le.
Th e same ana lysis can be app lied to an unbalan ced CAST ciphe r with two 4 x 32
S-boxes. As a result , we assu me that the cipher has an 8-roun d pseudo-it erati ve
characteristi c wit h a differential prob abili ty of (2- 6 ) 4 = 2- 24•
5.2 .3 Effectiveness of Iterative C haracteristics
In general. by applying the best iterat ive or t he pseudo-it erative characteristic and
using an (R - Nfl)- round at ta ck on an R-round unbalanced CAST cipher . the prob-
abili ty of a right pai r occurr ing will be
(5.8)
where p is a different ial proba bilit y of a best N I i-round iterat ive or a pseudo-ite rative
characteristic. Th e d iffere ntia l at tack needs TJ right pairs . The num ber of chosen
plain texts requ ired to uniquely iden tify a right subkey is given by ND = TJIPn/II • •v", '
Based on the ite ra t ive characteristics given in Table 5.12 and the ones assu med in
Sect ion 5.2.2. a summary of the di fferential cryptanalysis is shown in Table 5.16.
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S-box Numbe r of Prob ab ility of Plaineexts
m x n .H Rounds Characteristic Needed
8 x 56 1 - -
8 x 32 1 24 2 -~
"
2"
32 2
"
2
2 20 2-
"
2
24 2-
"
2
4 10 2-~ n 2~
12 2- ' n 2'
8 x 16 1 80 2-
"
2
88 2- '
"
2
2 24 2
"
2
28 2
"
2
4 x 32 2 24 2 -"
"
2"
32 2
"
2
4 24 2
"
2
28 2- "
"
2"
8 12 2-
"
2
14 2
"
2
Table 5.16: Summary of Different ial Cryp tan alysis Based on the Best Iter at ive and
the Pseudo-It erat ive Characteristics
We do not include the case of an unbalanced CAST cipher with one 8 x 56 S-
box since the likelihood of occur rence of an 8-ro und iterative characteristic with a
differential probability of 2- 1 is so small that it is ext remely unlikely. On the other
hand. we can not find an 8-round pseudo-iterative characterist ic with a reasonable
differential probability in our ana lysis.
5.3 Biham's Chara cte ri stics
There is anoth er app roach for differential cryp tan alys is of unbalanced CAST ciphers.
which is somewh at different from the generic differential cryptanalysis considered in
Section 5.1 and Section 5.2. Th is approach was introduced by Biham [5J. Biham
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applies the at ta ck to Khaf re! [211,which can be seen as an unbalanced CAST cipher
with M = 1, m =8, and n = 32. In th is sectio n , we exte nd Biham's attack to our
general class of unbalanced CAST cip hers. It appears to be another pract ical way to
differenti al ly attack the unbalanced CAST ciphers wit h reduced rounds.
The main idea of differential cryp ta nalysis of the unbalanced CAST ciphers is
based on the fact that the number of input bits of an Scbox is less than the numbe r
of output bits . f rom the analys is results of Sect ion 5.1, it can be seen that for an
S-box wit h n » m, the maxi mum entry value of the out put XORs is practically 2 for
a particular input XOR. Furt hermore, since there are tota lly 2"'· 2"'-l input XOR
pairs in the XOR table of an S-box, which is usually less than 2" possib le output
XORs , only about 12;..-1 output XORs will occur. for example, an 8 x 32 Scbox has
about 2(5 input XORs which is 2- 17of 231 possible output XORs. An 8 x 16 S-box
bas 215 inp ut XORs and , hence, less than about half of 2 16 possible output XORs are
used .
Tab le 5.17 illustrates one of Biham's characteristics used to attack a l&-round
unbalanced CAST ciphe r with M = 1, m = 8, and n = 32. We categorize it as
Biham 's Type I charac teristic. The rotation and swapping operation are defined in
Secti on 4.3.3. Each value 0 describes a zero byt e XOR value. Each letter denotes
a non-zero byte XOR valu e. The exact non-zero XOR values may vary for d ifferent
right pairs . Th e superscript t means th at the byte of the output XOR must be equa l
to the corresponding byte of the left half such that the inpu t XOR of the S-box in th e
next round wiII be zero. Each occurre nce of t causes a reduct ion of the probab ility
I Khafre uses a different S-box afte r every eight rounds .
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Rnd Left Half Right Half Output XOR Probabili ty
-'.p 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 w, I , y,
"7 .4 0 0 0 W, I, y, r, B C D E
8 r, w, I , y , F C D E r, w, I, yl p - 2- 8
9 E F C D r, w, I, 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 r, w, I , E F C D y, r, w, II p= 2- 8
11 D E F C y, r, w, 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 y, r, ws D E F C I, y, r, wI p= Z- 8
13 C D E F I, in r, 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 I, ur r, C D E F w, I , y, ,I p = 2- 6
15 F C D E w, I , y, 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 w, I , y, F C D E r" w" I " y"
-'.C E F C D Zll W" I " y"
Table 5.17: Biham 's Type I Character istic of a 16-Round Unbalanced CAST Cipher
with ,H = I, m = 8, and n = 32
of the characteristic by 1/ 255::::: 2- 8. Therefore, the probabilit y of the characteristic
is about 2- 32 .
From the charact eristic, we can see that the output XOR of the 7-th round can
be easily extracted by XORing the left half of the plaintex t XOR with the left half
of the ciphertext XOR and rotating the result by eight bits . This happens because
the 7-eh round is the only odd round whose output XOR is not zero. Since there ace
only about 215 possible input XOR pairs for the Scbcx, the re are at most 215 possibl e
output XOR values for Be DE, which is only 2- 17 of 23 2 all possible XOR values .
..\5 a result , most of wrong pairs can be easily discarded by comparing the BCVE
to all possible output XOR values of the Scbox. [f a right pair occurs, we know the
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actu al values of the in put XOR E [0 the S-box in the 16-th ro und and one byte of
the outp ut XOR, ZIO = zu. Since the re a re only 2' output XO Rs for that input
XOR E , by looking up the XOR tab le, the output XOR of t he last round functio n
Z IOW IOX IOYIO can be decided with a very high probability. Laing the method described
in Sect ion 3.1.1. we can count the subkey bits used. in the 16-th round .
T his at tack needs '1 right pairs obtained. from a pool of abo ut rJ • 232 pairs which
are formed by 1] • 233 chosen plaintexts. This number of plain texts can be drastically
reduced. by using a com pact structure of2 8 encryp t ions which gene rates 215 pairs [51.
Since the plain text XO R t:J. P has one degr ee of freedom, A., which can have 28 - 1
possible values, the compact structure chooses all 28 possible values for that byte and
a constant random value for remaining seven bytes of th e plain texts, and encrypts all
plaintexts. The refo re. the attack needs '1' 232 . 28 /2 t ~ = 11 ' 225 encryp tions .
An even better characteristic with a prob abili ty of2- 16 is shown in Tabl e 5.18. \Ve
categorize it as Biham's Ty pe II charac teristic. T he left half of the ciphe rtex t XOR is
the XORsum of the outp ut XORs oft be 9-t h (by one byte rot a tion) and 11-tl1rounds ,
as well as the non-zero plaint ext XOR byte .4. T his XOR sum has at most 230 possible
values. and this can be used to discard the wrong pairs . Using the same compac t
st ruc tu re, '1' 216 • 28/2 15 = 1] ' 29 encryp tio ns (or plaintexts) are needed. It should be
noticed that although Type II characteristic has a lar ger probability p, it also has a
larger l' since wrong pairs can not be discarded. efficient ly an d more counting work
bas to be done. So the SNRs or two counting schemes could be simila r, and we believe
tb at in both cases 1] is small. Altho ugh this implies that the Type II charact eristic
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Rnd Left Half Right Hal f Output XQR Proba bili ty
.::,.p .{ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A w, x, y,
"9 A 0 0 0 w, x, y, =1 B C D E
10
"
w, x, y, F C D E =, w, x, y,
11 E F C D =3 W, X, y, H I J K
12 y, z w, x, L .tl .v 0 y, =, w, xl p= 2- 8
13 0 L .tl .v y,
" w'l 0 0 0 0 014 0 y, =, w, 0 L .tl N x. y. =. wl p= 2- 11
15 .v 0 L M x, y, zr 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 x, y,
"
N 0 L M w. x. y,
"
'::"C .tl N 0 L w, x, y, =,
Table 5.18: Biham's Type II Characte ristic of a 16-Roun d Unbalanced CA ST Cipher
with J[ = 1, rn= 8. and n = 32
is more useful in an attack, it should be noted tha t for every plaintext difference , a
lot more work is necessary in the counti ng scheme for tbe Typ e II character istic than
for the Type I characterist ic . Both characterist ics can be exte nded to characteristics
with more than sixteen rounds . However. every addit ional eight rounds will have
a 2- 32 fixed reduction of the probability. Thus the characteristics become quickly
imp ractica l to be applied for many more rounds.
Table 5.19 shows Biham's Type I characteristic used to attack an 8-round unbal-
anced CAST cipher with J.J = 2. m = 8, and n = 32. Table 5.20 shows Biham's
Type II characteristic. Both characterist ics have a 2- 32 fixed. reduction of the differ-
ential probability for every additional four rounds. Although Type I characteristic
has lower differential probability than Type II. DEFG in Type I has only about
2U possible XOR values, but CDEF in Type II has about 230 . Therefore, Type I
can be used to discard wrong pairs more efficiently than Type II. Using a compact
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Rnd Left Half Right Half Output XOR Proba bility
.:.p
.4 B 0 0 e 0 0 0
1 .4 B 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 e 0 A B 0 0 0 0 0 0
.3 0 0 .4 B 0 0 e 0 D E F G
4 e 0 0 0 D E H [
""
x, 0' 0' p =2- 16
5 H [ D E w, x, 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 w, x, H [ D E y, .:, IU~ .r~ p= 2- 16
7 D E H [ y, z, 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 y, z, D E H [ iu I, y, z,
.:.e H [ D E w, x, y, I ,
Ta ble 5.19: Biham 's Type I Char act eris t ic of an 8-Ro und Unbalance d CAST Cipher
with AI -=2. m = 8, and n = 32
Rnd Left Half Right Half Out put XOR Pr oba bility
::>.P .4 B 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 B w, I, y, z,
5 A B 0 0 w, x, y, I, e D E F
6 y, z, w, x, G H E F y, '::2 wt xl p = 2- 16
7 E F G H y, I, 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 y, I, E F G H w, I, y, z,
.:.e G H E F ws I, y, I,
Table 5.20: Biham's Type II Characte ristic of an 8-Round Unbala nced CAST Cipher
wit h J,I = 2, m = 8. and n = 32
structure . n . 29 encryptions are needed to attack the 8-round cipher with Type II
char acte ristic . which is similar to the amount of encryptions required to a t tac k a
15-round unbalan ced CAST cipher with J! = L m = 8, and n = 32 using Type II
characterist ic.
Since an unbalan ced CAST cipher with Al =2, m = 8, and n = 32 bas tbe XOR
table of the round function twice as large as an unbalanced CAST cipher with .\J =1,
m =8, and n =32, t he differential cryptan alysis of the cipher with ,U = 2 requires
more compu ting time to ident ify the right and wrong pai rs. Therefore, t he cipher
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wit h .U = 2 is a lit tle stronger than the one wit h J,[ = 1 if Equatio n -l.2 holds for
both ciphers.
Table 5.21 is Biham's Type II characteristic used to attack a Is-round unbalanced
CAST cipher wit h J.[ = 1. m = 8. and n = 16. an d has a probability of 2- 16 . T he
Rnd Left Half Right Half Out put XOR Probability
::.p .4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 y, z
9 .4 0 0 0 0 0 y, z, B C
10
"
0 0 y, .4 0 B C x, yl p =2- 8
11 C .4 0 B z, 0 x, 0 0 0
12 0 z, 0 x, C .4 0 B !h x,
13 B C .4 0 0
"
!h
"'
D E
H x, 0 z, y, B C F E z, y1 p=2- 8
15 E B C F x, 0
"
0 0 0
16 0 x, 0
"
E B C F y, z
::.C F E B C 0 X, y,
"
Ta ble 5.21: Biha m's Type II Characteristic of a Ifi-Ro und Unbalanced CA.5T Ciph er
with .'1.[ = 1. m = 8. and n = 16
characteristic also has a 2- 32 fixed reduction of t he differential probability for every
addi t iona l eight rounds. By looking at the Table 5.21. we find that the outp ut XORs
of the 9-th an d the 13-th rounds. Be and DE. have abo ut 2 lS possible XOR values ,
and F EB C has at most 230 possible XOR values . Furthermore , we notice t hat the re
is a zero-byte in the ciphertext XOR. It is helpful to discard wrong pairs and increase
its SNR. As a result , we believe t hat an unbala nced CAS T cipher with ;\tl = 1, m = 8,
and n = 16 is more susceptible to Biharn's attack than an unbalanced CAST cipher
with Al = 1, m = 8, and n = 32, based on th e sa me number of rounds. Using a
compact structure, it requi res 11 . 29 encry ptio ns to attack the 16-round cipher with
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the characteristic of Ta ble 5.21.
An unbalanced CAST cipher with M = 2. m = -I.. and n = 32 has the sam e
charac te rist ics of Tab le 5.1i and Table 5.18. Also. an unbal a nced CAST cipher with
.\1 =-I., m ="',and n =32 has t he same characteristics of Table 5.19 and Table 5.20.
However, since the round functions of t he cip hers are constructed by small -l x 32
Scboxes, and their possible out put XO R va lues are less th an the corresponding round
funct ions combined by large Scboxes , th e characteristics have high SNR1i . For ex-
amp le, although an unbalanced CAST ciphe r with four -1 x 32 S-boxes has the same
characterist ic proba bility as an unb alanced CAST ciphe r with two 8 x 32 Scboxes,
the possib le outpu t XO R values of the round funct ion are about 2[6 . (2J }4 = 228 for
four 4 x 32 Scboxes. and a bou t 216 • (21 ) 2 = 230 for two 8 x 32 S-b oxes. It is easier
for the characteristic constructed by small S-boxes to discar d wro ng pairs . Therefor e.
the round function cons tructed by small S-boxes (e.g. -l x 32) is weaker than the
correspond ing one combined by large S-boxes (e.g. 8 x 32).
Biharn's attack is more difficult to apply to unbalanced CAST ciphers whose
outpu t XORs of the round functions can take all possi ble values of 2", because we
can not identi fy the right and wrong pairs directly. However, because output XORs of
the round func tio n are not uniforml y distributed, a statistical attack may be still val id,
although the implementat ion of the cryptanalysis is sign ificantly more complicated .
Such unbalance d CAST ciphers have th e roun d functions constructed by eight 4 x 32
Scboxes , two 8 x 16 S-boxes, t hree and four 8 x 32 Scboxes.
Biham's attack is not applicab le for unbal an ced CAST cip hers wit h ~\t[ =1, m = 8,
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and n = 56, and .'1.1 = 2. m = 8, and n = 48. since both ciphers have no swapping
and the output bytes of t he round functions are XORed with al l data bytes except
the byt es fed into the round functions.
In general, Biham's Type I characteristic of a 2.vli- round unbalanced CAST ct-
pher has a differential probabili ty of 2- 32 , and Type II cha ract eristic of the 2NI i-round
unbalanced CAST cipher has a differential probabilit y of 2- 16 • On the othe r hand ,
Type I characteristics can be used to discard wrong pair s more easily t han Type II
charac teris tics. Therefore, both type s of characte risti cs could have similar SNRs al-
though the work involved in t he counting scheme of Typ e II characteristics is much
more extensive. Both characteris t ics have a 2- 32 fixed reduct ion of th e differential
probability for every additional Nil rounds.
A summary of the differential cryp tanalysis results of unbalanc ed CAST ciphers
based on Biham's Type II characteris tics is given in Tabl e 5.22.
5 .4 Co ncl usion
ln this chapter. we have exten ded t he method of analyzing the distr ibuti on of entries
in th e XOR table to unbalanced CAST ciphers, and st a tist ically anal yzed the likeli-
hood of occurrence of Nil -round ite rati ve charac teristics with reasonab le differential
probabilities for unbalan ced CAST ciphers. As a result , it is possible for an unbel -
anced CAST cipher with two 8 x 32 S-boxes to have a -t-round iterative characteristic
with a differential probability of 2- 14 • Since it is difficult for the unbalanced CAST
cipher with one 8 x 32 S-box to have an 8-round iterative characteristic with a differ-
ential probability of 2- 7, we have examined pseudo-Iterative chara cteristics and have
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S-box Number of Probability of Plainrexts SNR
mx n -~[ Rounds Char acterist ic Needed
B x 56 1 - -
B x 32 1 16 ?- . -2 medium
24 2 n . medium
32 2 7/·2 ' medium
2 8 2-
• - 2
low
12 2
• - 2 ow16 2 '1 - 2' ow
4 -
8 x 16 1 16 2- . - 2 high
24 2
. - 2 high
32 2 n . 2 high
2 - - -
.. x 32 2 16 2 . -2 highest
24 2- 71 -2'" highest
32 2
• - 2" highest4 8 2-
• - 2
very high
12 2 . - 2 very hig h
16 2 71 ·2 very high
8 - -
Tab le 5.22: Resu lt of Different ial Cryptanalysis Based on Biham 's Type 11 Cbe rac-
teristics
found that an B-round iterative characterist ic wit h a different ial proba b ility of 2- 28
is reasonable one.
As well, we have done differential cryptanalysis of unbal anced CAST ciphers with
two types of Biham 's characterist ics. In general , Biham 's Type 11 characte ris tic of
a 2Nll. round unbalan ced CAST cipher has a d ifferen tial probabili ty of 2- 1' , and a
2- 31 fixed reduction of differenti al probability for every addit ional NI L rounds . Our
analysis shows that a 32·round unbalan ced CAST cip her with one 8 x 32 S-box and a
16-roun d unbalanced CAST cip her with two Bx 32 S-boxes are resist an t to different ial
crypta na lysis, based on Biham 's Type 11charac teristics .
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In particular, by combining the conclusions of ehe iterative charac te ristics and
Biham's characteristics. the 32-round unbalanced CAST cip her with one 8 x 32 S-box
which is equi valent to th e 8-round origina l CAST cipher according to Equation ~ .2 and
the 24·r ound unbalanced CAST cipher with two 8 x 32 Scboxes which is equi valent
to the 12-round original CAST cip her require more chosen plaintexts than the 264
possible plaintexts and hence appear to be resistant to both forms of diffe rential
cry ptanalysis.
i5
Chapter 6
Linear Cryptanalysis of
Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
[0 this chapter, we examine tbe resistance of unbalanced CAST ciphers to linear
cryptanal ysis. .-\5 in the previous chapter, we first analyze the nonlinearity of S-boxes
and t he linear cryptanalysis of the whole cipher st ructu re. Again . we enumerate a set
of typical parameters.
6.1 N onlinearity of S-boxes
Heys and Tavares (141have discussed the likelihood of randomly selectin g highly 000-
linear S-boxes of CAST. Given an affine m-bi t boolean func tion . g, the probability of
randomly selecting anot her m-bi t boolean function. f , so that the hamming distance
between f an d g , dU.g) = 2m - 'l , is given by
(6.1)
For reasonable values ofm, the probability ofd(f, g) < 2m - :l is bounded as P (d(f, g l <
2m - 'l ) < P(d(f, g) = 2m - 'l). Since any two affine m-bit bool ean functio ns are sepa-
rated by a distance of 2,",-1 or 2m • and there are 2,",+1 m-bit affine boolean functions ,
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t hen
Assuming tha t 2n m-bit boolean functions genera ted as a linear comb ination of the n
m-bit boolean functions are selected from a set of randomly generated m-bit boolean
functions , then the expected number of m-bit boolean functions which have a non-
linear ity less than 2m - 2 for an m x n S-box is given by
E(#UINU) < 2m -' I) < 2" · p. (6.3)
In cases where the expected value is very small. the probability tha t the nonlinearity
of the 5-box is less than 2"'-2 is also given app roximately by
P(N (S ) < 2m - ' ) < 2" . p. (6'<)
In the following sections . we discuss two issues related to nonlinearity of an S-box.
6.1.1 Effect of Output Size of an S-box on Its Nonlinearity
In Chap ter 5. we have seen tha t the probability of all the ent ries in the XOR table
of an S-box can be reduced by increasi ng the number of outpu t bits of the 5-box . It
is very likely that the entries in the XOR table will have only values 0 and 2, if the
numb er of outp ut bits of the S-box is large enough . However , linear cryptanalysis
puts a restrict ion on n , the size of t he outp ut of the Scbox . From Equa tion 6.1 and
Equation 6.2, the probab ility that a ran domly genera ted m-bit boolean function is
one of 2...+1 affine boolean functi ons is equal to PA, = 2"'+ (/2 2'" = 2...+ 1- 2" . The
expec ted number of rn-bit boolean funct ions which are affine boo lean functions for an
rt
S-box
.Vm i" E(# I INU) < Sm,,})
8)( 16 64 2-'"
8 x 32 64 2- I H
8 X 56 64 2.. ·•
62 2
60
58 2 ·
56 2- "
54 2-
52 2
50 2-"·
Ta ble 6.1: Expected Numbe r of Boolean Funct ions with N(f) < Nm ifl
m x n Scbcx is equal to 2" · PA, = 2(n-2 "'+".'+"0. U n ~ 2"' -m - 1. an m x n Scbox is
expec ted to have an m-bit boo lean func tion linearly derived from the n m-bit boo lean
functions which is equal to one of 2",+-1 affioe boo lean functions. This might allow
the cipher to be trivially broken. Therefore, it is potentially dangerous to make the
cipher secure by increasing the number of output bits or the Scbox with no limitation .
For example. since a -I.x 32 S-box meets the rela t ionship of n > 2'" - m - I, the
Scbox should have some affine boolean functi ons . This is why we can now rule out
unbalanced CAST cip hers constru cted by 4 x 32 5-boxes £rom our analysis of the
linear at tack . Such S-boxes should be avo ided because of the potential risk of linear
cryptanalysis.
Table 6.1 lists t he expected number of m-bit boo lean func t ions tha t have a non-
linearity less than Nmin for differen t sizes of S-boxes, based. on an analysis sim ilar
to Equatio n 6.3. [t is obvious that the probability th at a boo lean funct ion has a
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lower nonli nearity becomes high with the increasing of n for 8 x n Scboxes. It is very
unlikely that an 8 x 32 Scbox has an 8·bit boo lean funct ion whose non linearity is tess
than 64. On the other hand. it is very likely for an 8 x 56 S-box to have an g.bit
bool ean funct ion whose nonlinearity is less than 64. but unlikely for the Scbox to have
an 8-bit boolean function whose nonlinearity is less tha n 50.
6.1.2 Discussion of Assumptions Used in the Analysi s
The above an alysis ass umes that the 2" m- bit boolean funct ions linearly deri ved from
n m-bit boo lean func tions are ran dom ly selected. We conjecture t ha t this assumption
is quit e reason ab le, an d in th is sectio n we provide an expe rime ntal just ificat ion for
the assu mption.
In our anal ysis . we have assumed tba t al l n m-bit boo lean functions of an Scbox
are randomly generated, and each single bit in an m-bit boolean func tion 's truth
table has an equal chance to be 0 and 1. Due to the independence bet ween n m-bit
boo lean funct ions, each bit of a linear XOR sum of tbe n m-b it boolean functions will
st ill have an equal chance to be 0 and 1. As a result , we can conclude that all 2" m-
bit boolean functions are randomly selected , although possibly corr elated. Consider
that the XO R sum of two m- bit linea r boo lean functio ns is st ill linear; however,
t he probab ility tba t a randomly gene rated m-bit boolean functio n is linear is very
smal l, about 2"'+1/2 2" . For exam ple, the probability tbat a ra ndomly generated g.
bit boo lean function is linea r is 29 /2 2M>= 2- 247 , which is too smal l to be of concern .
Hence, even though the 2" m-bit boo lean functions of an S-box can be correl ated , the
corre lat ion is proba bly weak.
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In genera l. the value of n is often tOOlarge to exactly compute the nonl ineari ty
of an 111 x n Scbox. f or example. an 8 x 32 Scbox must have zn or about four billion
linear com binat ions of 32 8-bit boolean funct ions examined . Since wedo not know t he
theoret ica l nonlin earit y distribution of an 111 x n S-box. we experi mental ly examine
the distribution by sam pling a large subset of linear combina tions. ln other words.
we exam ine tbe nonlineari ty dis tribution by ran domly picking a subset of n. m-bi t
boolean functions. XORing the m and derivi ng its minimum distanc e to t he set of
m-bi t affine boolean functions . T he nonlinearity d istributio n of an 8 x 32 S-box with
222 such select ions is illustr at ed in f igure 6.1.
f or compariso n. we experimental ly examine t he distribution of the neares t dis--
ta nce to tbe set of m-bit affine boolean functions for random ly genera ted m-bit
boolean funct ions. Figure 6.2 gives the nonlinearity distribution of randomly gen·
erated 8-bit boolean functions by averaging four sets of 222 random ly genera ted 8-bit
boolean funct ions. Note tbat two dist ributions of f igure 6.1 and f igure 6.2 are similar
in shape.
[0 order to tes t bow close these two distributions are. we use the chi-square test
[9], a goodness-of-fit test, on our experimental data. The chi-square variable can be
used to test whethe r a set of observed frequencies and a set of expected. frequencies
are close enough so tha t we can conclude t hat th ey come from the same probability
dist ribution. The expected frequencies can be t hought of as the average number
of values expec ted. to fall in each ca tegory, based on some theoretic al probability
dist ributio n. The observed frequencies can be tbought of as a sample of values from
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Nonlinearity Distribution of an 8x32 S- box
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Figure 6.1: Nonlinear ity Distri bu t ion or an 8 x 32 S-box wit h 22'2 Selections
some pro bability dist ribution.
Assume tha t there are c cat egories (c > 1) and t he expected frequency in each
or these categories is denot ed as E\ l £,.... Ec. Simila rly, the c observed frequencies
are denoted as 0 \ ,O2, " , Oc, To test the goodness or fit or the observe d frequencies.
0; , to the expect ed frequencies, E;, we use
(6.5)
where X1C-l ) is a chi-square variable with (c - 1) degrees or freedom . When 0 ; and
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5 Nonlinearity Distri bution of B- Bit Boolean Funct ions
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Figure 6.2: Non linearity Distribution of 222 Boolean Func tions
115
E, are genera lly close, the value of :e will be small. Conversely, if 0; and E, are not
close. the value of X2 will be large. Thus, th e crit ical region for t he sta t ist ical test
given by Equation 6.5 will always be in the upper tai l of the X2 distri bution.
Consider two sets of nonlineari ty distribut ions of Figu re 6.1 and Figur e 6.2. We
assume t ha t the values of the observed frequencies , OJ, are from Figure 6.1. and the
values of t he expected freque ncies , Ei , are from Figure 6.2 . Then X2 = 39 with
33 degrees of freedom . By looking up the X2 distribution table (9J, we find that
p(xb ~ 47 .1) = 0.05. Th us, a t the 0.95 level of significan ce, we can say that both
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non linea rity dis tributions are very close, based on the sampling data we have. This
result further supports t he assumption t hat the linearity of each boolean funct ion
deri ved by combining output bit boo lean functions of an Scbox can be based on
considering each boolean function as independent.
6.2 Linear Cryptanalysis of the Ciphers
The objective of linear cryp tan alys is is to find a linear approximat ion of a cipher only
deri ved from plaintext, ciphertext, and key terms. A general linear approxima tion of
a cipher is derived by com bining a number of linear approximations of t he 5-bo xes of
di fferent rounds so t hat intermediate terms are canceled . These linear approximations
of the Scboxes usually contain both inp ut and output bit s. For a round function
const ructe d from small Scboxes. such as in DES , it is feasible to find a best linear
approximatio n of the cipher by completely searc hing all possible combina tions of the
linear approximations of the S-boxes of differe nt rounds. However, this method is
difficult to apply to the round funct ion const ructed with larger S-box es, such as in
the original CAST cipher .
In this section, we first introduce a linear approximation structure called an iter-
ative linear approximation for a round function, and apply th is structure to att ack
our unbalanced CAS T cip hers with typical pa rameters .
6.2 .1 Iterativ e Lin ear Approximation
The S-boxes in the round function of DES are implemented in parallel; t heir ou tp ut
bits are directed to the out put bits of the round funct ion with only a change of the ir
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position because of t he per muta t ion. The nonlineari ty of each Scbox can be directly
utilized by linear cryptan alysis to construct the linear approximation o( the round
function. Therefore . the nonlinearity of the Scbox is much more import ant for the
cipher to resist linear cryptan alysis. This is also tru e (or the case of unbalanced CAST
ciphers with .\1 = 1.
On the other hand, (or the original CAST or unbalanced CAST ciphers with
.\ / > 1. the output bit of the roun d functio n is XORed wit h the corresp onding
out put bits of all S-boxes. Th erefore , the nonlineari ty of the rou nd function is the
result of the nonlin earities of all S-boxes in the round function . Even if one or more
S-boxes have low nonli nea rit ies, the combination of all S-boxes may st ill have high
nonlineari ty . Thi s feature makes the round functi on of the origi nal CAST stronger
than the one of DES.
In Section 6.1.1. we have analyzed the nonlinearity dis tributions of the S-boxes
for nonlineari t ies less tban 2"'-2 . westill do not know tbe comp lete nonlinearity
distri butions of t be S-box.es because the exha ustive calculation is rtme-consumieg
work. Assum ing a lower bound of the nonlinearity of 64 for 8 x n S-boxes having
n ~ 32 ap pears to be acceptably high and is not known to be tigh t . However,
even if t here exist non lineari ties less than 64 for 8 x n S-boxes having n ~ 32, we
still do not know whether these nonlineariti es are useful to const ruct tbe best linear
approximations of t he round function and tbe cipher.
We consider an interes ting linear approxi ma tion struct ure called. an Nil -round
ite rative linear approxi mat ion, which has t he fonn that the value of the XOR sum
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of a subset of out put bits of a round function is equal to 0 or 1 with a pro bability
significant ly different from 1/ 2. This form is shown as
E!1Z" ~b
j=1
(6.6)
where b E {a, 1}, Z'J represents iJ-t b outp ut bit of the round function, and a repre-
seats the number of outp ut bits involved in the iterative linear approxima tion. :'-iote
that an iterative linear approximation does not involve any input bits of the round
funct ion. As a result , concatenating an iterative linear approximation to itsel f any
number of times does not int roduce any intermediate terms, and has a fi..xed reduc-
t ion rate of the probability for each additional iterat ive linear approximation. In
fact. an iterative linear approximation is quite similar to an iterat ive cha racte ristic
of differential cryptanalysis at a structural level. Figure 6.3 shows such a z-round
iterative linear app roximation applicab le to balanced CAST ciphers. In Figure 6.3.
r = R;, e ..e R•. where Rt, represents iJ-t h bit of the right half block of t he input
to a cipher round. and ~ = Zil e .. $ Z i"., where i l • _ . _i~ denote fixed bit positions
of the right half block. R, and the out put of the round function. Z .
If an unbalanced CAST cip her has :.\If= 1, the output bits of the round function
are direc tly the output bits of the Scbox. Then the probabili ty th at t he XOR sum
of a subse t of outp ut bits of the round function is equal to 0 or 1 can be derived
by calcu lating the hamming weight of t he XOR sum of the corresponding subset of
m-bit boolean functions of the S-box. If an unbalanced CAST cipher has M > 1, the
output bits of the round function are derived from the XOR sum of the corres ponding
output bits of all Scboxes. Th en t he proba bility tha t the XOR su m of a subset of
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r or r-
Figure 6.3 : 2-Rou nd Itera t ive Linear Approximation
output bits of the round funct ion is equal to 0 or 1 can be determined. by calculating
th e hamming weight of th e XOR sum of the corresponding subset of m-bi t boolean
functions of every 5- box and combining th em with Mat sui 's P iling-u p Lemma [191.
An unbalanced CAST cipher can have many iterat ive linear approximati ons of the
form of Equation 6.6. Th e best one has the proba bility farthest from 1/2 . Matsui's
Piling-up Lemma is described as the following :
Lemma 6.1 (Piling-up Lemma ) Let X. (1 ~ i 5 n) be independent random vari-
ables whose values are 0 with probability Pi or 1 with probability 1 - Pi. Then the
probabilit y that X I e .'(2 EEl .. e X n = 0 is
1/2 + 2"- ' .lJ.(P. - 1/ 2).
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Let I, be an m-bit boolean function generated. by XORing a subset of n m-bi t
boolean functi ons of output bit s of an m x n S-b ox S; and W i be the ha mming weight
of Ii, where i = 1. " . _\1. For a randomly selected. X E to. I}"' , the probability of
I, = a is given by
pu. ~ 0) ~ 1 - F'
or the probability of Ii = 1 is given by
pu. ~ 1) ~F'
(6,7)
(6.8)
Since each S-box is independently an d randomly selected, using Ma tsui's P iling-up
Lemma, we have a linear approximation for the round function
~f.~O (6. 9)
(6.10)
which holds with a probability
Pe = ~ +2M- 1g(~ - ~)
where all I. mus t involve t he same subset of outpu t bits of the Scboxes.
In general, an unbalanced CAST ciphe r should have a number of rounds, R , equal
t o an integer multiple of N/1. Assuming R = r- Nft. then the structure of Equation 6.9
will be used n, times by linear cryptanalysis to form an N/ l·r ound itera t ive linear
approximation. where »r = 1/2 · N lt -h/32 for h $ 32. Assuming that the pro ba bili ty
of Equation 6.9 is bounded by !p" - 1/21 :5 p, using Matsui's Piling-up Lemma, the n
t he probability of an ;V/l- round iterative linear approximation, PE , is bou nded by
IPe - 1/2 1:5 2nf- t . p" f .
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(6.11)
Finally, an R- round unbalanced CAST cipher will have
(6.12 )
where PL is de fined in Sect ion 3.2. and the nu mber of plaintexts required in the attack
will be
(6 .13)
determined as in Section 3.2. It is obvious t hat if one of Ii has the hamming weight
close to 2"'-1 , PI': will become close to 1/2, and Nt will increase drastically.
6 .2 .2 Application of the Attack to Specific C iphers
As we d iscuss in Section 6.1.2, f can be seen as a randomly generated m-bit boo lean
funct ion . The probability that f has the hamming weight of w is given by
P (wt(f) ~ w) ~ ( ': ) /2' - .
and the proba bilit y that wt(f) < w is given by
,=.- ,( ?m )
P(wt(f) < w) = L -. /,,-.
) = 0 )
(6 .14)
(6.15)
The probability distribution of w is a binomial distri bu t ion with mean 1J. =2"'- 1 and
variance (1 = 2(m - 21/2 , and can be app roximated by a normal distribution with the
same mean an d variance. Accordi ng to ou r analysis in Sectio n 6.1.2 , the re are 2n
randomly and independently gene rated m-bit boolean functions for an m x n S-box.
T herefor e, the prob ability th at an m x n S-box has at least one m-bit boo lean function
whose hamming weight is less than w or greate r than 2m - w is given by
p=I-(1 -29)"
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(6. 16)
S-box Hamm ing \Veigbt Pro bab ility Probabili ty
m x n w P (wt lf ) < wi l -p
8 x 16 84 9.59 x 10 99.87%
8 x 32 T2 3.39 x 10-'''' 99.71%
8 x 56 56 5.04 x 10 99.93 c
Table 6.2: Scboxes wit b All Boolean Funct ions Having Hamming Weights Greater
Than w and Less Than 256 - w for a Cert ain Probabilit y
where () = P (wt(f ) < w) and w:5 2m- 1.
First , we consider an 8 x 16 S-box. Assuming tbat w == 84, then () = 9.59 X 10- 9
and p = 1.3 X 10-3 by calculating Equat ion 6.15 and Equation 6.16. Hence, we expect
that alI 8-bit boolean funct ions of tbe 8 x 16 S-box have the hamming weight grea ter
tban 83 and less than 173 with a probability of 99.87%.
Secondly, for an 8 x 32 S-box , assuming that tv =72, we have () = 3.39 x 10- 13 and
p = 2.9 X 10- 3• Therefore. all 8-bi t boolean funct ions of t he 8 x 32 S-box are expected
to have the hamming weight greater t han 71 and less t han 185 with a proba bili ty of
99.71%.
Finally. assuming that an 8 x 56 S-box has w = 56. then () = 5.04 X 10- 21 and
p = 7.3 x 1O-~ . As a resul t . we expec t that al l 8-bit boo lean funct ions of t he 8 x 56
S-box have t he hamming weight grea ter t ha n 55 and tess than 201 with a probability
of 99.93%.
A summary for 8 x n Scboxes with al lS- bit boolean functions baving the hamming
....'eights greate r than w and less tha n 256 - w for a certain probability is given in
Table 6.2. It can be seen that a large Scbox may have a boolean funct ion whose
hamming weight is farther from 2....- 1 than a small S-box with a similar probability.
This boolean function may be used to const ruct a useful linear app roximation.
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For an unbalanced CAST cipher with .\f = L m = 8. and n = 16. substitu ting
lL' = 84 into Equation 6,10, we have IPe - 1/ 21 ~ p = 2- 1.3, Since ", = 2 for
each eight rounds , from Equat ion 6,l L the prob ability of an S-round iter ative linear
ap proximati on is bo unded by Wf: - 1/ 21~ 2--1. As a result . t he number of plaintexts
required for lineae cryptan alysis to determi ne one equivalent key bit with a 97.i%
confidence level is at least 262 for an 8O-round cipher. and 268 for an 8S-round cipher,
If an unbalanced CAST cipher has J! = 2, m = 8. and n = 16 and assuming that
all S-bit boolean functions of two 8 x 16 S-box es are bounded by w = 84. then we
have !Pe - 1/2 1~ p = 2-4 , which is the same as the probabili ty of a -t-rcund iterat ive
linear approximatio n since n, = 1 for each four rounds . T he num ber of plaint exts
required to determine one equivalent key bit is at least 262 for a -4O-round cipher, and
268 for a 44-roun d ciphe r.
Similarly, for w = 72 for an unba lanced CAST cipher with J,! = 1. m = 8. and
n = 32. we have IPe - 1/ 21 ~ p = 2- 2.2. Since n, = -4for each eight rounds , the
proba bility of an 8- round iterative linear a pp roxima tion is bounded by WE'- 1/ 21:s
2- $-' . The number of platn texts requi red to determ ine one equivalent key bit is a t
least 2150 for a -48-round cipher, and 269 for a 56-round cipher.
Also, for an unbalanced CAST cipher with At = 2, m = 8, and n = 32, we
assume that w = 72, resulting in IPe- 1/21 ~ p = 2-3.~ . Since n,= 2 for each
four rounds , the pr oba bility of a -l-round iterat ive linear approxima t ion is boun ded
by WE - 1/2 1 ::; 2-5.1. Clearly, the num ber of plaintexts required to determ ine one
equivalent key bit is at least:z60 for a 24-round cipher , and 269 for a 2g..round cipher.
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m x n .H Ip, - 1/ 21 -V/I n WE 1/ 21
8 x 16 1 2- 8 2 2-
2 2- • 1 r8 x 32 1 2-" 8 •
.)-"
2 ., • 2 , '
• 2 ". 2 1 2-;>'8 X 56 1 2- 8 7 2-"
Ta ble 6.3: Summary of t he Pro babilities of .Vj i-Round Iterati ve Linea r Approxima -
tions
In the same way, for a balan ced CAST ciphe r wit h .\J = .l, m = 8. an d n = 32.
ass um ing that w = 72 for all four 8 x 32 Scboxes, then we have Iv"- 1/2 1 :5 P = 2-''>.8 .
which is the same as the p rob a bility of a z-round it erat ive linear ap proxima tion since
n f = 1 for each two rounds. Th e num ber of plaintexts required to determ ine one
equivale nt key bit is at least 260 for a 12-round ciphe r, and 269 for a 14-roun d ciphe r.
In comparison. tbe loose an alysis of (141imp lied tha t a 12-round original CAST ciphe r
needs at least 250 known plaintexts .
If an unba lanced CAST cipher has _~[ = 1, m = 8. and 11 = 56, subst itut ing
w = 56 into Equa tio n 6.10. we have Ip" - 1/21 :5 P = 2- 1.8 . T he probab ility of an
a-r ound ite rat ive linea r a pp roximation is bo unded by WE - 1/2 1~ 2- 6 .6 since n, = 7
for each eight rounds. The num ber of plaintexts requi red to dete rmine one equ ivalent
key bit is at least 258 for a 40-round cipher. and 269 for a 4S-round cip her.
A summary of the probabili ties of N/l· round ite rat ive linear app roximations is
given in Table 6.3. Note t hat al l N/l-round iterative linear approxim ati ons have the
sa me pro bability for unbal anc ed CAST ciphers whose roun d functions ar e cons truc ted
by th e same type of S-box . Alth ough an 8 x 16 S-box has a lar ger w and smaller
I p~ - 1/21 than an 8 x 56 Scbox for th e similar probability given in Ta ble 6.2 . tbe Nil·
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round ite rative linear approximation made of 8 x 16 Scboxes has a higher probability
than the one made of 8 x 56 Scboxes. This is because only two bytes of the left half
block are XORed by the output bits of the round function constructed by 8 x 16
S-boxes in each round, while seven bytes of the data are XORed by the output bits
of the round function constructed by 8 x 56 S-boxes in each round .
Note that Tab le 6.3 lists the upper bounds of the probabilities of N/l-round ite ra-
tive linear approximations. The real probabilities will be much smalle r in a practical
linear cryptanalysis. This is because the rotation operation causes tbe plaintext bit
positions to be changed every round for an unbalanced CAST ciphe r and an N /I-
round iterative linear approximation is combined by nr different subsets of output
bits of the round function. If one of the output bit boo lean functions has tbe hamming
weight dose to 1/2 , tbe probability of the N/l -round iterative linear approximation
will become close to 1/2 rapidly, and the iterative linear approximation will be useless
for linear cryptanalysis. Therefore, large n, or;\J help the unbalanced CAST ciphers
become resistant to linear cryptanalysis.
A sum mary of linear cryptanalysis based on iterative linear approximations given
in Tab le 6.3 to un balanced CAST ciphers with different parameters is shown in Ta-
ble 6.4. Int erest ingly, if two cip hers satisfy Equation 4.2. they will have the same
security level acco rding to the analysis techn iques used here. It should be noted that
the number of known plaintexts required to linearly cryptanalyze a cipher can not
exceed 264 if the block size of tbe ciphe r is equal to 64 bits. For the cases in tbe
table where the plaintexts needed exceed 264 , the imp lication is that such a cip ber is
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Scbox Xumber of Plaintexts
mxn xt Rounds Needed
8 x 16 I 80 2"
88 .,
2 ,0 2
"
2
8 x 32 1 ,8 2'0
56 2
2 2, 2
28 20>
, 12 2
U 2
8 x 56 1 ,0 2=
,8 2
Table 6.4: Summary of Linear Cryptanalysis with Iterative Linear Appr oximations
theoretically secure against linear cryptan alysis.
6. 3 Concl usion
We have cons idered the linear cryptanalysis of unbalanced CAST ciphers. First of
al l. we have anal yzed the nonlinearity of Scboxes which are used in our unbalan ced
CAST ciphers. It can be seen that a large Scbox has a lower nonlinearity than a
small Scbox and ther e is a trade-off between the nonlinearity requirement and the
XO R distribution requirement . Then. we have provided an experimental jus t ificat ion
for the assumption that 2R m-b it boolean functions linearly combined by n rn-bit
boo lean funct ions are randomly selected. Finally, we have int roduced the concept of
th e iterative linear approximation and app lied it to the attack of unbalanced CAST
ciphers. The analysis result shows that a -IS-round unbalanced CAST cipher with
one 8 x 32 S-box and a 24-round unbalanced CAST cipher with two 8 x 32 S-box are
secure against linear cryptanalysis.
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Chapter 7
Information Theoretic View of
Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
In this chap ter , we p resent an analysis of unbalanced CAST ciphers from an info r-
ma rion theo ret ic po int of view. First. we derive simple equations of calcu la ting an
ent ropy and informat ion leaka ge. Secon d , we app ly these equations to analyze the in-
formation leakages on the round funct ion level for unbalan ced CAS T cip hers . F inally.
we analyze th e inform ation leakages on th e cipher level.
7 .1 Information Leakage
Ent ropy and informa tio n leakage are defined in Sect ion 2.3.2 by Equation 2.8 to
Equa tion 2.11 , and can be used as one measure of the cryp tographic str engt h of a
cipher. In t his sect ion , we discuss entropy an d informat ion leakage in detail.
Deline a ran dom variable Z . such tbat Z E {a, I }. By Equa tio n 2.8. the entropy
of Z is given by
H (Z ) = -[P (Z = 0) logP(Z = 0) + P(Z = I) logP(Z = 1)1 (7.1)
where P(Z = 0) is the prob ab ili ty of Z =0, P(Z = 1) is the pro bab ili ty of Z = 1 ,
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and th e base of the log is 2. l ett ing IP(Z =0) - i l = :~. then
L'sing a Taylor's series expansio n.
IOg( ~ +e) = - 1 +2e - 2!,2 + ~ ::3 _ . (7.3)
Substitutin g Equation 7.3 into Equation 7.2. and assumin g that c, is sufficient ly
small, we have
H (Z ) '" l - 2<~. (7.4)
It is obvious that if e, -+ O. H (Z ) -+ 1. which means that th e random variable, Z .
has maximum uncertai nty of its outcome.
Define another ran dom variab le X E {O. l} such t hat P(X = 0) = P(X = 1) = l.
By Equa t ion 2.9. the condit ional entrop y of Z given X is
H (Z IX ) = - .t,P(X ) Lt,P(ZIX ) IOg p (Z IX )] . (7.5)
Let IP( Z = 0IX = 0) -ll = f':10 and IP (Z = 01X' = 1) - H= f' :-Ih and assu me that
~ZiO and Em are sufficient ly small . t:si ng Eq uat ion 7.3 again . we have
(7.6)
The information leakage or mutu al inform ation between random varia bles X and
Z is defined as
I (Z . X ) =H (Z ) - H (Z IX) . (7.7)
An information leaka ge equal to zero impli es that information a bout X does not
redu ce th e uncert ainty of Z. and vice versa . In an ideal cipher. we ar e int erest ed. in
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zFigure 7.1: Bit St ruc ture of the Round fun ction
H( Z ) = 1 and [ (Z , X l = O. where Z represents a ciphert ext bit and X represents a
plai nte xt bit .
7.2 Information Leakages of Round Functions
An unbalanced CAST cipher emp loys AI m x n Scboxes in it s round funct ion. Each
output bit of the round fun ction is generated by XORing corresponding ou tp ut bits of
all Scboxes. F igure 7.1 shows the bit structu re of the round function of an unba lanced
CAST cipher, where Xi re presents one of input hits of an m x n Scbox S;, 1'; represents
one of output bits of tb e Scbox. and Z represent s one of out put bit s of the round
function . where Z = e~l Y,.
An m x n S-hox may be viewed as a 2m X n binary matrix, in which each colum n
represents an output hit for tbe inputs corresponding to each row. Since each Scbcx
is ran doml y and independently generated, the probability tha t each bit is zero or one
in th e binary matrix is 1/ 2. T herefore , the numbe r of zeros for each output bit in
t he binary matrix is a b inomial distribution with G 1 = 2m and PI = ql =1/ 2, wb.ose
mean is JlI = G1PI = 2,..- 1 and var iance is O"t =~ =2 (m-2 11'l.
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Assum e that !pcr; = 0) - 1/ 21is bounded bY':1 with a confidence level of VI' Let
IP (Z =0) - 1/21 = € z . Using Mat sui's Piling-up Lemma [191. .....e have
(7.8)
Subs ti tuting Equation 7.8 into Equatio n 7.4. we have [he uncondit ional entropy of Z
(7.9 )
Similarly, in the binary matrix, there are 2rn- 1 rows correspo nding to a value of
zero and 2rn- 1 rows corresponding to a value of one for a particu lar inp ut bit . Given
an input hit equal to zero or one, the number of zeros for an out put hit is a binomial
distribution with G2 = 2rn- 1 and P1 = q2 = 1/ 2, whose mean is IJ.2= G 2P1 = 2m - 2
and varia nce is (72 = ,jG 2P2 Q2 = 2( m-J1J2.
Assume that IP (Y, ~ 0 IX, ~ 0) - 1/21 and IP (Y, = OIX, ~ 1) - 1/21 Me bounded
bY':2 with a confidence level of V2 . Let IP(Z = 0IX j =0) - 1/21 be £:10 , and IP( Z =
OIX, = 1) - 1/21 be £:11' Since ;\l m x n S-boxes are rand omly and independently
generated , P( ~ IX;} = P(~ ) , where j #; i. Assume that IP (l'j =0) - 1/21 is bounde d
by "t wit h a confidence lend of Vt . Using Matsui's Piling -up Lemma, we have
(7.10 )
Subs tit uting Equat ion 7.10 into Equation 7.6. we have the cond ition al entropy of Z
given Xi
(7.1 1)
Since all entropies are less than or equal to one and H (Z ) ~ H(Z jX d , by Equa -
tion 7.7, the static input-output bit information leakage between Z and Xi is bounded
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by
(7.12)
It can be seen that the magni tude of th e information leakag e between an input bit
and an output bit of a round funct ion ma inly depends on the number of inpu t bits
of an Scbcx, m , which influences e.. and the number of the S-boxes, .\J . which the
round function empl oys.
Consider now the computatio n of the confidenc e level with which Equation i .9
and Equati on 7.11 hold. Assum e that a random variable z repre sents the number
of zeros in a randomly generated C -bi t binary vector Y . and satis fies a binomial
distri but ion wit h mean 1J. and variance a . Let P (z ~ zo) = a , where Zo :5 1J.. Then
POz - 1J.l < ~ - zoo ) = 1 - 20 , which means that Iz - ~l is less than p - '::0 with a
confidence level of 1 - 20 . Since z/C = z / (2p) represents the probability of Y =0,
we may say that IP(F = 0) - 1/21 is less than e with a confidence level of v , where
e = 1/2 - :zo/C and v = 1 - 20 . Mean whi le, if t here ar e n such randomly generated
G-bit binary vecto rs, th e confidence level . or the probability, wit h which all Ys satisfy
jP (Y = 0) - 1/ 21< c, will be (1 - 2o:)n :::::: 1 - 2na if 2na « 1.
Consider an 8 x 56 S-box, the number of zeros for each output bit is a binom ial
dist ribution with G I = 28 and P I = qt = 1/ 2, whose mean Pt = 27 and variance
0'1 = 23• For Zo = 97, we have Q = 6.4 X 10- 5, and hence s . = 1/ 2 - 98/256:::::: 2- 3
with a confidence level of Vt = 1 - 2 . 56 . 6.4 x 10- 5 ::::= 99.3%. Therefore, we may say
tbat IP(Y; = 0) - 1/ 21 is bounded by ~ l = 2- 3 with a confiden ce level of VI = 99.3%
for an 8 x 56 Scbox.
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In th e sam e way, given an input bit equal to zero or one. the number of zeros for
an output bit is a binomial distribution with G2 =27 and P2 = q2 = 1/2 . whose mean
11-2= 26 and var ian ce 0'2 = 2 2.5 • For =0 = 39. we have Q = ·j.8 X 10- 6 • Then =2 =
1/2-40 /128::::: 2- 2A ....rith a confidence level of""l = 1-2 · 2 ·8 ·56 · 5.8 X 10- 6 ::::: 99.0%.
Therefore, we may say tha t IP (l"~ = OIX. =0) - 1/ 21 and I P ( l'~ = 0IX, = 1) - 1/2 1
are bounded bY: 2 =2-2.t with a confidence level of V2=99.0% for an 8 x 56 S-box.
Since the sizes of all S-boxes are smaller than 8 x 56 in our anal ysis and cor-
responding confidenc e levels will be higher for the selected values ore, and :2, we
assume that ~t , /.II , : 2, and II:i for an 8 x56 S-box are suitable for all remaining 8 x n S-
boxes. From Equation 7.9, Equation 7.11, and Equation 7.12, the unbalanced CAST
ciphers with one 8 x 16, one 8 x 32, and one 8 x 56 S-box all have H (Z ) ;::: 1 - 2- 5 •
H (Z IX;) ;::: 1 - 2-3.8, and feZ , X;) ::; 2- 3 .8 for the ir round functions with a high level
of confidence. The unbalanced CAST ciphers with two 8 x 16 and two 8 x 32 S-boxes
both have H( Z ) ;:::: 1_2-9 • H (ZI X ,) ;::: 1- 2- 7.8, and f eZ, X, ) ::; 2- 7 .8 for their round
functi ons . ..\ balanced CAST cipher wit h four 8 x 32 Scbox es bas H (Z ) ~ 1 _ 2- 17 •
H (ZIX. ) ~ 1 - 2- L5 -8 • and f eZ, Xi ) ::; 2- 15.8 for its round function. It is obvious that
a round function constructed by more S-boxes has less information leakage.
The ab ove analysis bas assumed that all input bits of the round funct ions are
rando mly and inde pendently changed. We believe that the assumption is reasonable.
As we have disc ussed in Sect ion 4.3. each output bit of th e round function of an
unbal anced CAST cipher is influenced by all the inp ut bits and the rotat ion operation
immediately bring s some or all output bit s of the round functio n to the input position
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m x n .II H(Z) H(ZIX.) I(Z,X.I
8 x 16 1 1 2 1 2- 2
2 1 2 1 2 .. 2-'
8 x 32 1 1 2- 1 2-" 2- J ·8
2 1 2 1 2 2
4 1 2 1 2 2-
8 x 56 1 1-2 1 2-'" 2-'"
Table 7.1: Summary of Static Input-Output Bit Information Leakages of Round
Functions of Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
of the round function in t he next round. Therefo re. afte r two rounds al l input bits of
the round function will be changed .
A summary of static input-output bit information leakages of round functions is
given in Tab le 7.1.
As a comparison. we investigate the sta t ic input-output bit information leakage of
the round funct ion of DES. Since the output bits of the round funct ion are directly the
output bits of the S-boxes , information leakages between input and output bits of the
round function of DES can be obtained by examining each S-box directl y. Although
all out put bits of t he eight 6 x 4 S-boxes in DES are zero balanced. which means
that the unconditional entropy of each output bit of the round function is exactly
one. its conditional entropy is not . Table 7.2 can be used to derive the conditional
probabilities of the Scbox. 51 , where x , represents the i-th input bit , Y, represents the
j-th out put bit, Po is used to determine P (Yj = a lxi = 0) , and Pl is used to determine
P (Yj = alx i = 1) . The real cond itional probability in Table 7.2 is calculated by
P(YJlx ,) = 1/2 + entry/32. For example, P(Yz = OlxJ = a) = 1/2 - 3/32.
By looking at all eight S-boxes , we find that jP (Yj =0lxi = 0) - 1/21 = IP (y, =
0lx; = 1) - 1/21 = 3/32 ::::: 2-3.4 is a maximum value . Therefore. by Equation 7.5
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y, y, y, y,
Po p, Po p , Po p, Po p ,
x, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x, 0 0 - 1 1 1 -1 1 -1
x, -2 2 -3 3 -1 1 2 -2
x, - 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1
x, 1 -1 - 1 1 -1 1 -1 1
x, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7.2: Conditio nal Pr oba bilities of 51 in the Round Function of DES
and Equ at ion 7.7. the maximum static input-o utp ut bit information leakage of the
roun d functio n of DES is 2.55 x 10- 2 ~ 2- u . which is much greater than the balanced
CAST , almost equivalent to unb alanced CAST ciphers with two 8 x 16 and two 8 x 32
Scboxes. and less than unbal anced CAST cip hers with one 8 x 16, one 8 x 32, and
one 8 x 56 Scbox.
Un til now. we have discussed the static input-output bit informa tion leakages of
round functions of unbalanced CAST ciphers. The corresponding dynamic inpu t.
out put bit informat ion leaka ges. according to Figure 7.1. are defined as
1(t.Z, t.X,) ~ H (:>'Z) - H (:>.ZIt.X ,) (7. 13)
where ~X. = X. EB X,· is on e of inp ut b its of ao Scbox. ~}'; = Y;€ay.0is one of o utp ut
bits of the S-box, and t:J.Z = ZED Z · is one of outp ut bits of the round function.
where A Z =E9~1 t:J.yt. Since b it values of X. and X,· can be selected independen tly .
the bit values of yt and r:-, Z and Z· can be seen as independent . Deflne e, as
IP(.:lZ = 0) - ~ I . Using Mats ui's Pili ng-up Lemma , Equa t ion 7.8 and Equat ion 7.9
can be rear ran ged to
(7.14)
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and
(i ,15)
Similarly. define e: 1o as I P(~Z = O I~X =O) - lland t"~11 as IP (.,.). Z =OI.lX = 1)- ~ I .
Equation 1.10 and Equa tion T.ll can be rearr anged to
(; .16)
and
(; .17)
Therefore. t he dyn am ic input-output bit informa tion leakage is bounded by
(7.18)
The unbalanced CAST ciphers with one 8 x 16. one 8 x 32. and one 8 x 56 S-
box all have H {j, Z ) 2: 1 - 2-9 • H(~ZI..:U."i ) 2: 1 - 2-&.6. an d I {.:lZ . ll, ) S 2-'.15
for their round functions with a high level of confidence. The unbalanced. CAST
ciphers with twO 8 x 16 and two 8 )( 32 S-boxes both have H(~Z) 2: 1 - 2-1:'.
H(~ZI~\". ) 2: 1 - 2- 14 .6 • and 1(..:lZ.~X,} S 2- 14 .6 for th eir round functions wit b
a high level of confidence . A bal anced. CAST ciphe r wit h four 8 x 32 S-boxes has
H(.:lZ ) 2: 1 - 2- 3J , H(~ZI~X,:J 2:1- 2- 30.6• and l(~Z,~X.J :52- 30.& for its round
function . A summary of dynamic input-output bit informa tion leakages of round
funct ions is given in Tabl e 7.3.
As a compariso n. tbe maximum dynamic input-output bit information leakage of
the round functio n of DES is 8.92 x 10- 4 ~ 2- 10 •
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m x n J [ H(:>.Z) HPZI:>.X.) [(:>.Z .:>.X. )
8 x 16 1 1 2 1 2 2
2 1 2 1 2-. 00 2-.00
8 x 32 1 1 2- 1 2- 2
2 1 2- I 1 2- 2
• 1 2 1 2 2-'0.'8 x 56 1 1 2 1 2-" 2-'·'
Table 7.3: Su mmary of Dynamic Inpu t-Outpu t Bit Information Leakages of Round
Functions of Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
7.3 I n fo r m a t ion Leakages of the Ciphers
In this section we extend the analysis of t he informa tion leakage from a one round
level to a multiple round level. As previously, we assume that an unbalanced CAST
cipher must have a number of rounds, R. equal to an integer multiple of NI L. Let
this integer be r , so that R = r . N/I . Afte r every Nil rounds. each plai ntext bit will
be XORed with one of output bits of the round function nf = 1/2 · .V/ i - h /32 times
for h :$ 32. Each time the out put bit of the round func tion may be different . For
example , it can he seen by looking at Table 4.1 that the unbalanced CAST ciphe r
with one 8 x 32 S-box has eac h plain text bit XORed. with one of output bits of it s
round func t ion four t imes after every eight rounds.
In orde r' to get worst-case up per bounds on the information leakage , let the left
half block of plaintexts be unchanged and each bit of right balf block of plaintexts
be changed. randomly, independently, and with a probability of 1/2 . Assume th at
output blocks of the round function are independent between rounds . Using Matsui's
Piling-up Lem ma , from Equation 7.8 a nd Equation 7.9, an R-roun d unbalanced CAST
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cipher with J I m x n Scboxes will have
(7.19)
and
(7.20)
where Z represent s one bit of left half block of the ciphertext. Similarly, from Equa-
t ion 7.10 and Equation 7.11, an R·r ound unbalanced. CAST cipher with .\J ~ x n
S-boxes will have
(7.21)
and
(7.22)
where X represents one b it of right half block of the pla intext . Therefore, the static
input-out put bit inform at ion leakage between Z and X for an R-round unbalanced.
CAST cipher with .l l m x n S-boxes is bounded by
(7.23)
As a result, a 64-round unbalanced CAST cipher with one 8 x 16 S-box , a 32-
round unbalanced CAST cipher with two 8 x 16 S-boxes , a 32-round unbalanced
CAST ciphe r with one 8 x 32 S-box , a 16-round unbalanced CAST cipher with two
8 x 32 Scboxes. and an 8-ro und balanced CAST ciphe r with four 8 x 32 S-boxes all
have H (Z ) 2:: 1 - 2- 55 , H(ZIX ) ?: 1 - 2- 63 .8 , and I (Z ,X) :$ 2- 63 .8 , since all of them
have ,\il n , T = 16.
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mx n .\ f R H(Z) H(ZIX) £(Z.X)
8 x 16 1 64 1-2 1 2 2-
2 32 1 2- 1 2- 2-
8 x 32 1 32 1 - 2-l>:i 1_2-'33.11 2""-
2 16 1 2 1- 2 ?-
4 8 1- 2 1 - 2- 2-
8 x 56 1 24 1 2'~ 1 - 2- 0>' 2' ''·'
Tabl e TA : Summary of Static Input-Output Bit Information Leakages for Mult iple
Round Unbalanced CAST Ciphers
The anal ysis of tbe unbalanced CAST cipher with one 8 x 56 S-box is a little
different since there is no swapping operation in each round. However , tbe anal ysis
ca n st ill be carried on by keeping one byte of plaintexts unchanged and letting all
remaining plaintext bits change randomly, independently, and with a probability of
1/ 2. Then , the condition that the output blocks of the round function are independent
between rounds is reasona ble. Since", = 7 for every eight rounds , a 24-round cipher
has .Un,T = 21, H (Z ) ~ 1 - 2- 85 • H (Z IX) 2:1- 2- 83 .8 , and I(Z. X ) s 2- 83 .8 , which
is better than an 32-round unbalanced CAST cipher with one 8 x 32 5- box.
.-\ summary of st at ic input-output bit informat ion leakag es for mul t iple round
unbalanced CAST ciphers is given in Table 7..1.
The dynamic inpu t-output bit information leakages for multiple round unbalanced
CAST ciphers can be deri ved. from the corresponding sta t ic information leakages in
the same way as described in the previous section . From Equation 7.19 and Equa -
tion 7.20, an R· round unbalanced. CAST cipher with M m x n 5-boxes will ha ve
(7.24)
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and
(7.25)
Similarly. from Equation 7.21 and Equa tion 1.22. an R-round unbalanced CAST
cipher with J I m x n S-boxes will have
(7 .26)
and
(7.27)
The corresponding dynamic input-out put bit information leaka ge is bounded by
(7.28)
As a result . a 64-ro und unbalanced C.-\ST cipher with one 8 x 16 Scbox . a 32-
round unbalanced CAST cipher with two 8 x 16 S-boxes, a 32-round unbalanced
CAST ciphe r with one 8 x 32 Scbox. a 16-round unbalanced CAST cipher with two
8 x 32 S-boxes , and an s-eound balanc ed CAST ciphe r wi t h four 8 x 32 S-boxes all
have H(~Z) 2: 1 - 2- 129 • H(~Zi~·X ) 2: 1 - 2- l26 .6 , and 1(~Z.,;l}( ) s 2- 126 .6 , since
all of them have sam e 'un,T = 16. An 24-round unb alanced CAST cipher with one
8 x 56 S-box bas l'v[ n / T = 21. H(ilZ) 2: 1 - 2- 169 • H(~ZI~X ) ?: 1 - 2- 16 6 .6 , and
[( ~Z, ,;lX) ~ 2- L66.6 .
A sum mary of dy namic input-output bit inform ation leakages for mult ip le roun d
unbalanced CAST cip hers is given in Table 7.5.
Since every output bit of the round function of DES is zero balanced. its El is
equa l to zero an d the uncon di t ional entropy is equal to one . T he static and d ynam ic
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mx n JI R H( tlZ) H (tlZ I!lX) l(tlZ.tlX)
8 x 16 1 64 1 2-'~ 1 2-"° 2-"°°
2 32 1 2 1 2 2
8 x 32 1 32 1 2 1 2 -r-
2 16 1 2- 1 2- 2-
4 8 1 2- w 1 2-"° 2-"°"
8 x 56 1 24 1 2- 1 2- 2-
Tab le 7.5: Summary of Dynam ic Inpu t-Out put Bit Information Leakages for Multiple
Round unbalanced CAST Ciphers
input-output bit information leaka ges of DES will approach zero drastically afte r three
rounds. It is possib le to generat e S-boxes for unbalanc ed CAST ciphers that have
all their output bits to be zero balanced and hence make unbalanced CAST ciphers
possess the same feature as DES. Furthermore, some unbalanced CAST ciphers with
J;[ > 1 will have zero information leakag e for their round funct ions if such Scboxes
are selected. For an S-box having eigh t input bits . the probability that a randomly
generated 256-bit binary vector of an output bit of the S-box is zero balanced is( i;~ )12 256 :::::0.05. Therefore, it is not difficult to generate an 8 x 32 Scbox whose
out put bits are all zero balan ced.
7.4 Conclusion
We have provided a met hod to compute the upper bounds of the static and dynamic
Input-output bit information leakages for bot h sing le round and multiple roun d un-
balanced. CAST ciphers. As a result . although a round function const ructed. by more
Scboxes has a smaller information leakage, two ciphers will have the same information
leakage if Equat ion 4.2 holds . For z-round DES, the maximum static and dynamic
inp ut -output bit information leakages are 2- 5.3 and 2- LO, respectively. On the other
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hand. for ;VII -round unbalanced CAST ciphers with .\1 8 x 32 Scboxes. the correspond-
ing information leakages are bounded by 2- 15 ,8 and 2- 30 .6 . respecti vely. In order to
further reduce the informa ti on leakages. we have recommended that all out put bits
of the S-boxes generated for unbalanced CAST ciphers should have the sa me numb er
of zeros and ones.
It should be noted that we have only examined the information leaka ges at the
single bit level. Since the unbalanc ed CAST ciphers employ a set of larg e Scboxes.
th e investigat ion of the information leakages on the multiple bit level becomes much
more difficult . Furthermore, when an alyz ing t he informat ion leakages of the multiple
round unbalanced CAST ciphers, we fix some plaint ext bits to get the worst-case
upper bounds of t be informati on leakages. Ot herwise. t he analysis becomes tri vial.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
DES is about twent y year s old and is coming to the end of its usefu l life t ime. NIST
is calling for a new standard to replace DES which offers a higher level of security and
better efficiency, Th e original CAST cipher is one of a few proposed private-key block
ciphers which bas efficient and secure p roperties. In this the sis , we have presented a
new class of unba lanced CAST ciphers which requires less mem ory t han th e original
CAST cipher and given its securi ty analysis .
8.1 Summary of the Thesis
In tb is thesis , we have defined a family of priva te-key block ciphers referre d to as un-
balanced CAST ciphers which employ the same st ructure of S-box and round function
as tbe original CAST cipher but require a variable amount of memory depending on
the chosen paramete rs. Furthermore, we select a set of typical par ameters and inves-
tigate the securi ty of the ciphers wit h respect of differential and linear cryptanal ysis.
Although t he unbalanced CAST ciphers constructed wit h 4 x 32 S-boxes require
the least memory , a 4 x 32 S·box has at most 2-4 differen t 32-bit output vecto rs and
109
any linear combinations of such 2~ vectors can not produce all 232 different 32·bit
vectors. fu rthermore. a -l x 32 S-box should have some affine boolean func tio ns since
its outp ut bit size is much larger than its inpu t bit size. Therefore. such S-boxes
should be avoided beca use the potential risk to differential and linear cryptanalysis.
Th e unbalan ced CAST ciphers with one or two 8 x 16S-boxes are not as efficient as
the unbalanced CAST ciphers configured by 8 x 32 S-boxes with respect to differential
and linear cryptanalysis since t he outputs of the round funct ions const ruc ted with
8 x 16 S-boxes only influence half of the left half block bits. Also. it is very likely
for the ciphers t hat iterative characteristics can be found with a high differential
proba bility.
The 8 x 32 S-box, which is used by the original CAST cipher, seems to be most
appropriate for the unbal anced CAST ciphe rs. T he unbalan ced CAST cip hers with
one and two 8 x32 Scboxes require only 1/4 and 1/ 2 the memory oftbe original CAST
cipher, respect ively. The result of analysis shows that the 48-round unbalanced CAST
cipher wit h one g x 32 Scbcx and the 24-round unba lanced CAST cipher with two
8 x 32 Scboxes. which are equivalent to t he 12-round original CAST cipher in efficiency,
are resistant to both differential and linear cryptanalysis. we have also exam ined.the
unbalanced CAST ciphers from the persp ecti ve of informati on theo ry. As a result ,
the maximum sta tic and dynamic input-output bit informa tion leakages for the Nfl ·
round unbalanced CAST ciphers constructed by the 8 x 32 S-boxes ar e much smaller
than the corresponding ones for the 2-round DES.
The unbalanced CAST cipher with one 8 x 56 S-box is suita ble for 64-b it prcces-
liD
sor imp lementations and a -IO-round cipher is resistant to linear cryptanalysis. The
differential attack methods st udied in this thes is can not be applied to the cipher .
8 .2 Suggestions fo r Further R esearch
The design and analys is of unbalanced CAST ciphers bas not been completed. There
are many paths that may be pursued to extend the analyses cons idered in this thesis.
Throughout this researc h , we have not investigated the design of a key sched-
ule for unbalanced CAST ciphers. This issue should be explored further . A secure
and efficient key schedule algorithm should be consequently proposed allowing for a
var ia ble-lengt h cryp tographic key.
Another interest ing extension of the research presented in this thesis is to apply
the attack based on non- sur jectiv e round functions [271to unbalanced CAST ciphers.
Since the round functions of all unbalanced CAST ciphers are non -sur jective or non-
uniform. this might be a new weakness for the ciph ers . especially when the number
of round s is reduced to improve the encryption/decryption speed . Further research
in this ar ea is st rongly encouraged.
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